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Theories of Change for Promoting Empowerment and Accountability in 
Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings 
Duncan Green 
 
Summary  
This paper explores the current state of thinking among a range of aid actors (multilaterals, 
bilateral, applied scholars and international non-governmental organisations) on how to 
promote empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict and violence affected settings. It 
seeks to identify trends, gaps and weaknesses in that thinking, and propose research 
questions and hypotheses to test. 
 
Three underlying sources of confusion are identified that are hindering progress on both 
understanding empowerment and accountability (E&A) in fragile, conflict and violence 
affected settings (FCVAS), and taking helpful action to promote it. They are: 
 
 Theory of endogenous change (e.g. on how empowerment and accountability arise in 
situ) versus the theory of action of an external intervention 
 Fragility versus conflict: there is no clear justification for combining these different 
aspects into a single category 
 Empowerment versus accountability: donor analysis and practice has been 
overwhelmingly weighted towards accountability, exhibiting limited understanding or 
interest in the nature of power  
 
Keywords: fragility, empowerment, accountability, theory of change, theory of action, 
Myanmar, aid. 
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1  Executive summary  
This paper explores the current state of thinking among a range of aid actors (multilaterals, 
bilateral, applied scholars and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)) on 
how to promote empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict and violence affected 
settings (E&A in FCVAS). It seeks to identify trends, gaps and weaknesses in that thinking, 
and propose research questions and hypotheses to test for the Action for Empowerment and 
Accountability research programme (A4EA).1  
 
The paper has been written through a combination of desk review, consultation and a 10-day 
field trip to Myanmar in September 2016. Initial contacts and discussions with a range of 
practitioners and scholars led to a first draft, which was then posted on the author’s ‘From 
Poverty to Power’ blog for comment.2 
 
To a striking extent, donor and academic literature on E&A in FCVAS concentrates on 
theories of (exogenous) action. These are often confusingly termed ‘theories of change’ and 
come at the expense of what is arguably a much more important process – the way E&A 
ebbs and flows endogenously in FCVAS. Clearly distinguishing between theories of change 
and action and understanding how the system changes on its own are essential first steps in 
designing useful and relevant aid programmes, but are often skipped in the urge to get onto 
‘so what do we do?’ 
 
Considerable research has gone into identifying the factors behind ‘turnaround states’ that 
have moved from fragility to something like stable effectiveness, both historically and in more 
recent times. A recurrent theme in endogenous transitions to accountability in FCVAS is just 
how long they take – a generation or more - presenting a profound challenge to the short-
termism of the aid industry. But beneath such national transitions, FCVAS often exhibit 
‘pockets of functionality’ at various levels (different departments of government, or 
subnational and city administrations) that provide points of entry for promoting E&A. 
 
The historical record highlights the dynamics of change in FCVAS. This often involves 
sudden discontinuities (critical junctures) and the negotiation of new political settlements, 
(although inertia is also a critical factor) driven by a combination of ideas, interests and 
institutions. Power and political economy analysis are essential prerequisites to working 
effectively in these settings. 
 
A number of inter-connected features and drivers of change appear more salient in fragile 
than in non-fragile settings. With a weak or absent national state, non-state actors become 
more prominent, including faith organisations, diaspora communities and traditional 
authorities. Formal civil society organisations (CSOs) are often weaker in FCVAS, whereas 
other less formal civil society activities (funeral and savings groups, cultural associations) 
persist and can become stepping stones to E&A. Their fluidity and lack of clear 
organisational structure, however, often prevent them being recognised or supported by 
external actors. 
 
The increased importance of non-state actors underlines the particular importance of 
informal power in understanding and influencing E&A in FCVAS. Identity (regional, ethnic, 
religious) also plays a central role, acting as a reservoir of both trust and suspicion. 
 
Violence is a feature of many FCVAS and poses a significant challenge for external actors; 
endogenous change is likely to be less predictable, more emergent, less ‘projectable’. 
                                                 
1  www.ids.ac.uk/idsresearch/action-for-empowerment-and-accountability 
2  https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/please-comment-on-this-draft-paper-theories-of-change-on-empowerment-and-
 accountability-in-fragile-states/ 
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Interventions are potentially ‘high risk, high return’, with turbulent settings showing less 
inertia than more stable environments, but with the risks of failure or mistakes being far 
greater in terms of human suffering. Pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations all 
require both understanding and different kinds of response in terms of E&A.  
 
Traditional aid programmes have struggled to adjust to the unpredictable rhythms and risks 
of violent conflict. Conflict sensitivity approaches are a critical enabling factor, both reducing 
the risks and increasing the chances of success. Violent conflicts in places such as 
Myanmar have become entrenched, leading to a situation of multiple co-existing state and 
non-state authorities that challenges conventional citizen-state approaches to E&A. 
 
The lack of attention to endogenous change processes matters because such an 
institutionally self-centred approach has led to a series of weaknesses and oversights in the 
design of interventions, which a proper theory of change could help correct. Some of the 
main categories of gaps and missed opportunities include critical junctures, positive 
deviance (positive outliers thrown up by the system, even without interventions), the 
importance of non-state actors, the role of power and political economy analyses, and the 
importance of gender gaps. Gender blindness is particularly unfortunate because, in terms of 
empowerment, one perhaps unexpected feature of FCVAS is the enhanced role of women in 
post-conflict settings. Some of these gaps probably arise due to the prevalent processes and 
political economy of the aid business, with its constraints, structures and silos.  
 
Most of the relevant intellectual activity over the last 20 years has not been directly on E&A 
in FCVAS. Nor has it explicitly been framed in terms of theories of change or action. Instead, 
there has been a rich discussion on institutional reform and governance, including on 
FCVAS. In terms of E&A, since the early 2000s, there has been a considerable investment 
in analysis and policy advice on accountability, for example in democracy promotion, or open 
government, but with little examination of the particular process and challenges of FCVAS. 
However, there has been much less activity on the issue of empowerment. 
 
Donor approaches were initially heavily supply-side: advice and training for governments 
(both political leaders and officials) on the (often implicit) assumption that the problem was 
one of capacity, rather than of power and politics. Unsurprisingly, the supply-led approach 
failed in situations where power and politics were not aligned with the suggestions of donors, 
triggering a major shift towards demand-led approaches, stimulating citizen demand for 
services and accountability. Recent attempts to move beyond the supply/demand dichotomy 
brought different players together in search of locally relevant solutions to ‘collective action 
problems’. 
 
Today, donor thinking on E&A in FCVAS is at something of a crossroads. One current of 
thinking advocates deeper engagement with context, involving greater analytical skills, and 
regular analysis of the evolving political, social and economic system; working with non-state 
actors, sub-national state tiers and informal power; the importance of critical junctures 
heightening the need for fast feedback and response mechanisms; and changing social 
norms and working on generation-long shifts requiring new thinking about the tools and 
methods of engagement of the aid community. But the analysis also engenders a good deal 
of scepticism and caution about the potential for success, so an alternative opinion argues 
for pulling back to a limited focus on the ‘enabling environment’, principally through 
transparency and access to information. A third option makes the ‘both/and’ case for an 
optimal combination of direct intervention and enabling environment approaches. 
 
The following section provides an overview of the definitions of key terms used in this paper. 
Section 3 considers the importance of examining theories of endogenous change in FCVAS, 
and Section 4 focuses on informal power and the role of identity in shaping political choice. 
Section 5 examines the implications of violence and conflict on governance, which often 
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results in a situation of co-existing state and non-state authorities. Section 6 looks at the 
gaps and missed opportunities for external actors in not articulating a proper theory of 
change when focusing on FCVAS, whilst Section 7 moves on to examine why these gaps 
happen. Section 8 examines how theories of change and action have evolved over time, with 
Section 9 providing the current state of thinking. Finally the concluding section of the paper 
sets out some possible hypotheses to test on future directions for promoting E&A in FCVAS. 
 
2  E&A in FCVAS: Definitions of key terms 
This paper uses the following definitions of key terms: 
 
Accountability: A process for holding individual actors or organisations to account for their 
actions. Accountability requires transparency, answerability, and enforceability between 
decision makers and citizens (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008). Enforceability requires 
consequences or some form of sanction for acting outside agreed standards. 
 
Conflict: Conflict can be defined as ‘A relationship between two or more parties who have, 
or believe they have, incompatible goals’ (Fisher 2000: 4). This carries the important 
implication that conflict is relational, is present in every human society, can be constructive if 
managed well, and is usually necessary for social change. This wider definition can be 
contrasted with that of violence as the use of actions, attitudes, words, structures etc. to 
cause harm (Fisher 2000: 4). 
 
Empowerment: A process through which individuals or organised groups increase their 
power and autonomy to achieve certain outcomes they need and desire (Eyben 2011). 
Empowerment focuses on supporting disadvantaged people to gain power and exert greater 
influence over those who control access to key resources (DFID 2011). However there are 
tensions between subjective and objective definitions of empowerment. What is empowering 
to one person is not necessarily empowering to another. Understanding empowerment 
therefore needs to include people’s own experiences, rather than focus on a predictable set 
of outcomes (IDS 2011).  
 
Fragility: While there is no internationally-agreed definition of the term ‘fragility’ (Woolcock 
2014), most development agencies define it principally as a fundamental failure of the state 
to perform functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and expectations. Fragile 
states are commonly described as incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining rule of 
law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens 
(Mcloughlin 2016). However the use of the term ‘fragile states’ is both contested and 
evolving. Originally seen as an improvement on ‘failed states’, reflecting a more dynamic 
reality in which states can move between different levels of fragility, the term has 
subsequently been criticised for failing to recognise that pockets and facets of fragility exist 
in most (if not all) states, while few states are wholly fragile. Moreover, in many cases, states 
are not the only institutions responding to citizens’ needs – ethnic armed administrations 
(Myanmar) or faith organisations (much of Sub Saharan Africa) may also fulfil this role. 
Increasingly, analysts prefer the term ‘fragile contexts’ or ‘fragile settings’, the term preferred 
in this paper. The false dichotomy of fragile/non fragile states is one reason why this paper 
discusses examples from states not normally considered fragile, such as Bangladesh. 
 
The OECD has moved beyond a single categorisation of fragile settings towards a more 
universal approach for assessing fragility that captures diverse aspects of risk and 
vulnerability. Its 2015 ‘States of Fragility’ report proposes a working model for analysing all 
countries’ risks along five clusters of fragility indicators; 1) violence; 2) access to justice for 
all; 3) effective, accountable and inclusive institutions; 4) economic inclusion and stability; 
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and 5) capacities to prevent and adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and 
disasters (OECD 2015). 
 
The OECD’s typology potentially generates five different strands of ToC (sub-theories of 
change, or change pathways) in every intervention aiming at securing E&A in a fragile 
setting – which points to the need to be as clear as possible about what the aim of any given 
intervention is and very selective about pursuing it. 
 
Social Accountability: the extent and capability of citizens to hold the state accountable 
and make it responsive to their needs (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015). 
 
McGee and Kroesschell (2012) identified social accountability as just one of eleven forms of 
accountability, each with different characteristics in terms of who claims it, who gives it, over 
what, the political space in which it operates (e.g. claimed or invited), the tactics used (mass 
mobilisation, consensual processes) and why people pursue it. 
 
Table 2.1: Different types of accountability and their characteristics 
Type of 
accountability 
Who claims? Who gives? Over what? Where? 
(space) 
How? 
(examples) 
For what? 
Why? 
Social Social actors, 
e.g. CSOs, 
social 
movements 
State, aid 
agencies, 
private sector 
Concerns, 
identity 
demands 
Claimed, 
invited 
Mass 
mobilisation, 
social audits 
Apply 
democratic 
checks and 
balances, 
deepen 
democracy, 
empower 
people, 
improve 
service delivery 
Citizen-led Citizens with 
rights 
State, aid 
agencies, 
private sector 
Rights Claimed, 
invited 
Citizen report 
cards 
Address 
deficits in 
fulfilment of 
citizen rights 
Public Public 
institutions, 
state bodies, 
social actors, 
citizens 
Public 
institutions 
Standards 
(laws, 
policies, 
regulations) 
Invited Official 
complaints 
and petition, 
procedures, 
litigation 
Enforce 
obligations of 
the state 
Institutional Public 
institutions, 
state bodies, 
social actors, 
citizens 
Public 
institution 
Standards 
(laws, 
policies, 
regulations) 
Invited Official 
complaints 
and petition, 
procedures, 
litigation 
Enforce 
obligation of 
the state 
Horizontal Public body Another 
public body 
on same level 
of hierarchy 
Standards 
(laws, 
policies, 
regulations) 
Closed Auditing, 
oversight, 
reporting 
Enforce 
obligation of 
the state 
(Cont’d).  
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Table 2.1 (cont’d). 
Vertical An actor 
which is non-
state or 
low/local-level 
state 
A more 
powerful 
actor, or one 
in a position 
to account to 
the 
accountability 
seeker 
Rights, 
concerns, 
state 
obligation 
Claimed, 
invited 
Petitioning, 
public 
hearing, 
mobilisation 
Enforce 
obligation of 
the state 
Bureaucratic Public Bureaucrats Obligation of 
state 
Closed, 
invited 
Official 
procedures, 
including 
through 
litigation 
Enforce 
obligation of 
the state 
Hybrid/ 
Diagonal 
Citizens/ 
social actors, 
possibly in 
alliance with 
one state 
oversight 
body e.g. 
Supreme 
Audit Office 
State Entitlements, 
rights 
Claimed, 
invited 
Social actions 
(collective) 
designed to 
activate 
formal 
accountability 
mechanisms 
Enforce 
obligation of 
the state 
Political/ 
Electoral 
Electorate, 
party 
members 
Party, political 
leadership, 
executive 
Manifestos, 
political 
commitments, 
party ideology 
Intraparty 
mechanisms, 
elections 
(local, 
national) 
Closed, 
invited, 
claimed 
Voting Ensure due 
representation 
of interests 
Downwards Citizens, 
service users, 
consumers, 
aid 
beneficiaries 
State, service 
provider, aid 
agency 
Service 
provider, 
project, 
programme, 
rights 
Claimed, 
invited 
Feedback 
and 
complaints 
mechanisms 
Assure quality 
and impact of 
programme on 
citizens/users 
Upwards Funder, 
guarantor of 
rights, 
oversight 
actor 
Funded 
actors, 
Service 
providers, 
Local public 
bodies, 
NGOs 
Resources, 
performance 
Invited, 
closed, or by 
written means 
only  
Reporting, 
impact 
assessments 
Assure 
responsible 
use of funds 
and acceptable 
performance 
Source: McGee and Kroesschell 2012: 11–12 
 
All of these kinds of accountability apply in parallel and overlapping spaces and processes in 
FCVAS as in non-FCVAS, but many will have particular characteristics in FCVAS that are 
relevant to the design and effectiveness of any empowerment or accountability intervention. 
 
Theories of Change: The definition of Theories of Change (ToC) is more contested: Hivos 
(2015: 12) defines them as ‘the ideas and hypotheses (‘theories’) people and organisations 
have about how change happens. These theories can be conscious or unconscious and are 
based on personal beliefs, assumptions and a necessarily limited, personal perception of 
reality’. Hivos distinguishes between ToC as a way of thinking (overall approach), a process 
(doing a ToC analysis/enquiry) and a product (the result of a ToC process).  
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This paper distinguishes two different aspects of ‘theories of change’ that are often 
conflated, especially by aid organisations. First, a ToC sets out an understanding of how 
endogenous change takes place in any given system; endogenous theories of change could 
also be termed ‘pathways of change’, since they may or may not reflect the conscious 
strategies of identifiable actors. With that distinction, the question for external actors 
becomes how to strengthen the conditions for certain pathways. Second, a Theory of Action 
(ToA) sets out the strategy and tactics to be adopted for an intervention by a given 
organisation, the stakeholders to be involved, and how the exogenous intervention will 
achieve the outcomes that are expected. In practice, many organisations use the term 
‘Theory of Change’ to describe their Theory of Action. The use of Theories of Action varies 
widely, from a compass (guide to adaptive interventions), to a fixed roadmap (a plan drawn 
up in advance and then implemented with little/no iteration or adaptation), to a box-ticking 
formality that is a condition to obtain funding but thereafter is of little practical use. 
 
The distinction between Theories of Change and Action is not just semantic – this paper 
argues that conflating the two leads to a systematic under-examination of the nature and 
dynamics of endogenous change, an exaggeration of the influence of external actors, and 
significant oversights and lost opportunities.  
 
Violence: This concept is framed through Moser’s typology of forms of violence (Moser 2001: 
36) as: 
 
 Politically motivated violence (such as civil and transnational war, domestic political 
instability), ‘the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or 
unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power’. Politically motivated sexual 
violence such as mass rape, sterilisation and kidnapping may be instigated by 
guerrilla conflict, paramilitary conflict or armed conflict between political parties and 
so on.  
 Economically motivated violence that involves the ‘commission of violent acts 
motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious for economic gain or to obtain or 
maintain economic power’: these would manifest in abductions and rape during 
economic crimes.  
 Social violence which entails violent acts committed by a desire, conscious or 
unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power. This would 
manifest at the interpersonal level through spouse abuse or sexual harassment by 
gangs, thugs or various public actors. 
 
While Moser’s examples of violence are all gender-based, they can also apply to other 
expressions of violence, noting that motivations can sometimes be multiple and overlapping. 
In addition to the physical forms of violence, there is also epistemic violence in the form of 
the use of language, rhetoric and possibly laws to ‘other’, malign or denigrate an individual or 
group, which is highly relevant to the A4EA programme’s exploration of norms, perceptions 
and meanings of violence in relation to collective action.  
 
 
3  Theories of endogenous change in FCVAS 
Donor and academic literature on E&A in FCVAS concentrates on the role (positive or 
negative) of external actors, but the privileging of interventions by aid actors risks obscuring 
what is arguably a much more important process – the way E&A ebbs and flows 
endogenously in FCVAS. Understanding how the system changes on its own is an essential 
first step in designing useful and relevant aid programmes, but it is often skipped in the urge 
to get onto ‘so what do we do?’ 
13 
 
 
One of the striking features of the donor literature and practice on E&A in FCVAS is the 
absence of history. In Liberia, for example, ‘there is a complete dearth of literature about 
accountability that focuses on the pre-war period - the war is always used as a key factor in 
determining post-war governance - it is, but so are many of the dynamics that are part of a 
much larger history which is almost entirely ignored today’ (Blair Glencorse, pers comm, 
September 2016). 
 
An exception is provided by World Vision’s ‘Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC)’ 
tool,3 which equips NGO staff to work with key players to analyse and articulate the actors, 
symptoms, political economy, trends and triggers of ongoing and sometimes chronic political 
and economic instability. Amongst the questions asked are: what phases has the context 
moved through? For example, an MSTC report on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
in 2011 reflected on phases in the country’s history relevant to the current context and 
events under each of those phases, with emerging themes from the historical analysis (e.g 
politics, ethnic issues, resources, broader regional tensions, etc) (World Vision, pers comm, 
September 2016). 
 
Over the longer run, fragility and violent conflict are not a permanent condition, and much 
research has gone into identifying the factors behind ‘turnaround states’ both historically 
(Tarrow 1998) and in more recent times (Rosser 2006). A recurrent theme in endogenous 
transitions to accountability in FCVAS is just how long they take. The World Bank argues 
that such change takes at least a generation (World Bank 2011). But long-term change on 
E&A poses particular problems for the traditional business models of aid organisations, with 
their short project cycles, a point discussed below. 
 
National states may be weak or absent overall, but experience in FCVAS suggests the 
existence of pockets of functionality at different levels (similarly, nation states may appear 
coherent, but include substantial subnational regions that exhibit aspects of fragility) (Roll 
2014). These pockets of effectiveness are often subnational – effective local states at 
provincial or local levels. When conflicts wreak havoc or state institutions become seriously 
incapacitated, human and interpersonal resources and bonds often suffer less damage at 
the local level than at higher levels. As a result, when the time comes to rebuild, it is often 
easier to make headway at the grassroots (Manor 2007). 
 
James Putzel and Jonathan di John argue that ‘Analysis and policy discussion around fragile 
states has concentrated almost entirely on the “central state”, failing to see the particular 
place of cities in state formation historically and the contemporary importance of growing 
cities as key sites of state building and state erosion’ (2012: v). In cities, they believe, ‘a 
diversity of relatively well organised interest groups can challenge reigning political practices’ 
(Putzel and Di John 2012: vii).  
 
In addition to within sub-national governments, pockets of effectiveness also exist within 
national states. In the DRC, for example, a context analysis by Oxfam found that the 
education sector was functional in a way that other line ministries were not (Oxfam 2014a). 
In 2016, World Vision DRC signed a memorandum of understanding with the DRC 
Department of Education to support the government in the development of a citizenship and 
accountability curriculum for primary and secondary school children. The MoU follows 
several years of working with the government on social accountability activities across a 
range of areas including education, health, birth registration and the extractive industries. 
World Vision staff argue that such social accountability programming helps to improve 
development outcomes through improved service delivery, but also plays an important role 
in empowering community members. According to World Vision DRC Advocacy manager, 
                                                 
3  www.wvi.org/making-sense-turbulent-contexts 
14 
 
Vianney Dong, ‘People start understanding development in a different way. There is change 
in the mentality to “I know what I am supposed to do, what I can expect from government 
and how I should claim my rights”, especially in an environment where speaking the truth is 
very difficult. It’s really a significant achievement’.4 
  
There are also, of course, individuals and groups of individuals within given ministries and 
local governance structures who are working to do the right thing, even in the face of 
institutional incentives that work directly against them. However, if their desires and actions 
run counter to institutional incentives and social norms, they are always likely to face an 
uphill struggle. 
 
Re-examining history highlights the dynamics of change. Pointing to the example of Taiwan, 
Ha-Joon Chang argues that turnarounds can, however, be gradual. Even when government 
finances are poor, it is possible to create pockets of clean bureaucracy with meritocratic 
principles and relatively attractive salaries, and later use them as templates to clean up the 
rest (Chang 2007). 
 
But, particularly in FCVAS, change more often resembles plate tectonics – the steady build-
up of social and political pressure, punctuated by sudden earthquakes of instability and 
violence. FCVAS resemble particularly earthquake-prone regions, often lurching from one 
critical juncture to another in rapid succession (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Such 
junctures include economic crises, violent conflicts, natural disasters, political scandals and 
regular changes of leadership: civil war and genocide led to Rwanda’s transformation under 
Paul Kagame; famine and civil war led to Ethiopia’s subsequent stabilisation and economic 
take off under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi; and economic meltdown triggered Vietnam’s 
Doi Moi reforms.  
 
In terms of empowerment and accountability, critical junctures can unleash a stifling degree 
of fear and violence, but they can also act as catalytic events, in which new possibilities 
emerge, and pre-existing grievances or desires are channelled into collective action. It is 
sometimes during these moments that actors have the opportunity to make ‘the impossible’ 
become ‘the inevitable’, especially if they are well-prepared with ideas and networks (Oxfam 
2011). Whether as drivers of change or repression, the importance of critical junctures is 
systematically underplayed in donors’ theories of action (Green 2016). 
 
The pressures that erupt during critical junctures are partly fuelled by long-term structural 
and demographic shifts, such as the rise of urban elites and new middle classes demanding 
political change (if only for a fairer share of the spoils) (Putzel and di John 2012).  
 
Political Settlements Analysis (PSA) is one approach used to understand the drivers of 
change and nature of conflict resolution (Kelsall 2016). At the heart of PSA is the idea that 
societies cannot develop in the midst of all-out violence or civil war; yet the way different 
societies solve the problem of violence, the political settlement they craft, creates powerful 
path-dependencies for the way they do or do not subsequently develop. PSA is about 
understanding ‘the formal and informal processes, agreements, and practices that help 
consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about 
interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power’ (Laws and Leftwich 2014: 1), and that 
these will play out across two levels, involving both intra-elite and elite-non-elite relations 
(Laws 2012).  
 
In the mid-2000s, DFID’s ‘drivers of change’ programme5 made some important progress in 
understanding endogenous change processes in a range of contexts, but it fell victim to the 
                                                 
4  World Vision, pers comm, October 2016 
5  www.odi.org/publications/5399-drivers-change-dfid-doc 
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demand for ‘so what?’ – lessons that could be applied rapidly to improve the quality of aid 
programming. In retrospect the programme’s interest in exploring endogenous power, 
institutions and agency appears ahead of its time, and its fate perhaps symptomatic of the 
neglect of endogenous change processes. 
 
Kaplan and Freeman (2015) give a sense of the range of different types of political transition 
out of fragility, contrasting transitions imposed from above (as in Myanmar), engineered from 
outside (as in Iraq), achieved from below (as in Tunisia), or negotiated (as in Spain). 
Successful transitions have occurred in post-authoritarian countries (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia 
and the Baltic states) and post-conflict ones (e.g. El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia). 
Yet, there are many more examples cited of disappointing transitions – and even the 
comparatively successful ones face numerous challenges. They conclude that in such 
transitions: 
 
Two key lessons stand out. First, the horizontal often matters more than the vertical: 
that is, the society-society relationship needs as much or more attention than the 
society-state one. Second, as politics often works in either virtuous or vicious cycles – 
with inclusive behaviour begetting more inclusive behaviour and vice versa – equity is 
more important than effectiveness. In other words, various groups within a fragile 
state, and the general public, will be more likely to forgive inevitable mistakes and 
delays (within reason) during a transition if they feel they are being treated fairly. 
(Kaplan and Freeman 2015: 7) 
 
More scholarly attention has been paid to turnarounds in terms of economic growth: what is 
not clear is the nature and direction of any causal links between the quality and quantity of 
such growth turnarounds and transitions to new levels of empowerment and accountability. 
Mushtaq Khan argues that the two are interwoven, with important implications for 
intervention: 
 
Societies have a distribution of organisational power that is difficult to change in the 
short run, but which does change over time as a result of economic development 
(creating new organisations and power structures), and through social and political 
mobilisations... One way of achieving progress is if successful developmental 
strategies of these types create a more diversified set of powerful organisations over 
time, and that is historically an important route towards a more accountable and 
productive society’.  
(Khan, pers comm, September 2016, based on Khan 2010) 
 
The focus on change and transition is however, only a partial view. Why change doesn’t 
happen is often just as important to understand and address. Inertia and resistance to reform 
and E&A can arise from a combination of ideas, interests and institutions (Green 2016). 
  
One expression of interest, corruption, plays an important role in many FCVAS. At the E&A/ 
FCVAS interface corruption can provide a self-organising function, albeit negative, 
introducing values, rules and order into what appears chaotic and dysfunctional, but acting 
as a block to further progress on E&A.  
 
4  Informal power and the role of identity 
The literature on fragile settings identifies a number of inter-connected features and drivers 
of change that appear more salient there than in non-fragile settings.  With a weak or absent 
national state, non-state actors become more prominent, providing justice and security 
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solutions that are more accessible and more in keeping with prevailing beliefs about justice 
(Domingo et al. 2013). Faith organisations, traditional authorities and tribal structures can 
provide a hub for change (Christian Aid 2016a; World Vision 2015), as can private sector 
networks, such as exchange houses in Somalia that enable effective cash transfer 
programmes. Diaspora populations can also play a role in constructing new kinds of 
legitimacy and accountability (Oxfam 2014a). 
 
Formal CSOs are often weaker in FCVAS. When there is a culture of fear, insecurity, social 
exclusion, and asymmetries of power either within a community or between citizens and 
government officials, citizens often fear involvement in accountability activities (Grandvoinnet 
et al. 2015). Poor and dispossessed people often perceive the state as an oppressor and 
exploiter, rather than a potential source of support. Other forms of organisation often persist, 
however, such as less formal civil society activities (e.g. funeral and savings groups, cultural 
associations, see Section 6 for more on non-state actors). These can become stepping 
stones to E&A, but their fluidity and lack of clear organisational structure often represent a 
challenge to external actors. 
 
Where there is cooperation brought about by exposure to violence, it is mostly observable 
within groups, rather than between groups, leading to forms of parochialism, or identity-
based insularity (Bowles and Gintis 2011).   
 
The increased importance of non-state actors underlines the particular significance of 
informal power in many (but not all) FCVAS. Beyond the formal world of rules, contracts, and 
state decision-making and implementation, power relationships in FCVAS are often 
characterised by both hidden and invisible power. Hidden power includes behind-the-scenes 
contacts and informal links based on clan, ethnic or religious links; invisible power stems 
from norm systems that shape popular beliefs about what is ‘normal’ or ‘natural’, leading 
some groups to exclude themselves (Green 2016).  
 
A learning review of Christian Aid’s DFID-funded ‘Power to the People’ programme extended 
the analysis of hidden and invisible power to include the ‘Importance of understanding 
citizens’ own perceptions of power’, citing an example from Kenya where ‘women used 
indigenous understandings of power relations to subtly influence change’ on women’s rights 
(Christian Aid 2015: 3). Christian Aid argues that this kind of power analysis should 
accompany the more conventional donor political economy analyses as ‘seamless 
processes. Both are iterative rather than one off and will continue to shape programme 
implementation’ (Christian Aid 2016b, slide 11). 
 
From the point of view of E&A, norms and invisible power are important everywhere, but 
particularly in FCVAS. In the absence of strong institutions, identity plays a central role in 
shaping choices on engagement, acting as a reservoir of both trust and suspicion. Donor 
‘impartiality’ can easily become an excuse to downplay or ignore identity issues. 
 
Identity is durable, both as a motivator and obstacle of E&A. One study of a six country voice 
and accountability project in Africa (the Mwananchi Programme) concluded ‘Citizen voice is 
rooted in social norms such as ‘respect for elders’ (Tembo 2012: 12). ‘It is in these arenas of 
power and livelihoods that citizens find room for manoeuvre, through small or large nudges 
or tensions in their own culture and traditions’ (Tembo 2012: 13). Pouligny (2010) concludes 
that international actors need to gain an understanding of the relationships, structures and 
belief systems that underpin institutions, and of the multiplicity and diversity of political 
institutions, cultures, and logics through which state-building processes may be supported.6 
 
                                                 
6  GSDRC Summary, www.gsdrc.org/document-library/state-society-relations-and-the-intangible-dimensions-of-
 state-resilience-and-statebuilding-a-bottom-up-perspective/ 
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Box 4.1: Case study: Somaliland v Somalia: an unusual natural experiment  
A comparison between Somaliland v Somalia is both revealing and discomfiting for external actors 
such as aid agencies, whilst demonstrating the role of identity in power politics. While Somaliland 
emerged from the  shared chaos of the 1990s (and a brutal effort by Somalia to put down its 
separatist movement) into relative peace and stability (some taxation, rudimentary public services, 
security, two peaceful presidential transitions through the ballot box, including one to the 
opposition), Somalia is a quintessential FCVAS.  
 
An analysis by Sarah Phillips (2013) of the reasons underlying this divergence does not make 
comfortable reading. 
 
Somaliland’s government has received virtually no direct financial aid, largely because it is not 
internationally recognised. The country itself gets some aid via NGOs and the UN, but the 
government has been generally outside this loop, forced to rely on local sources of funding. 
 
Perhaps of more importance than the financial aspects, this has meant there was no pressure to 
accept template political institutions from outside. Instead, Somaliland has had time and political 
space to negotiate its own (e.g. clan-based) political settlements. The process has involved a 
series of ad hoc, messy, consultative, and local, peace conferences. 
 
The peace process was almost entirely locally funded, due to Somaliland’s unrecognised status (so 
no bilateral aid or loans were available). It has produced a strong sense of local ownership 
(literally). In the words of one minister, when asked by Phillips about aid ‘Aid is not what we desire 
because [then] they decide for us what we need’ (2013: 31). 
 
Power politics has underpinned the transition. Somaliland’s second president has offered stability 
(and tax breaks) to the business elite in exchange for funding demobilisation and the development 
of state institutions. This has been effective but certainly not inclusive – these elites come mainly 
from the President’s own clan. But according to Phillips, Somalilanders generally still see it as a 
legitimate process – that’s what leaders do. 
Source: Phillips (2013) 
 
Box 4.2: Case study: The Mwananchi Programme 
The Mwananchi Programme, backed by DFID’s Governance and Transparency Fund, ran for five 
years (2008-2013) across six very different African countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Sierra 
Leone, Uganda and Zambia. 
 
The programme identified national coordinating organisations in each country, who then issued 
calls for proposals from local civil-society and media organisations to implement projects designed 
to find innovative ways to increase citizen ability to hold their governments to account (Tembo 
2013: 11). 
 
The programme followed a five step theory of action:  
 
 ‘Establish the underlying foundational factors. This includes the history of the formation of the 
state, the basis of the economy (especially public revenue), the roots of the social, political, 
cultural and economic structures within which fundamental public decisions are made, and 
the country’s geography and geo-strategic position in relation to other countries. These are 
the factors that fundamentally shape the social, political and institutional landscape, and 
therefore also the scope for constructive state-society bargaining, and the institutional 
arrangements for organising collective action.  
 
 Identify the rules of the game (formal and informal narratives). This refers to the formal and 
informal institutions that shape the incentives and capacity of key actors, the relationships 
between them, and how processes of political bargaining play out. These are critical in 
influencing opportunities for different groups, including those representing poor people, to 
mobilise and engage in collective action that promotes development over the medium term.  
(Cont’d.) 
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 Identify game changers or interlocutors of change. This is an emergent category because the 
actors are identified from the narratives or from the analysis of the rules of the game in the 
second step. In this case the idea is to identify who the main influencers are in a given 
context - a politically derived category as opposed to the traditional stakeholder analysis 
where everyone benefiting or affected by a given intervention or activity is mentioned. 
 
 Explore engagement dynamics. These pertain to the behaviour (formal and informal) of 
various actors around specific governance issues (including policy issues). This too is based 
on exploration of the narratives or rules of the game but is focused mainly on observable 
behaviour in action rather than on formal or informal rules.  
 
 Establish institutional patterns and decision logics. Then, from these, find entry points or 
room for manoeuvre, towards the desired changes. In other words, from the analysis of: a) 
who the main actors are, and b) what their behaviours are; the programme would analytically 
reach some conclusions around what might be the most useful way to intervene in the 
context and around the issue, in order to achieve the desired outcomes. (Tembo 2013: 78-
79) 
 
The Mwananchi Programme identified three main lessons from its work: 
 
‘Accounting for contextual dynamics is of vital importance. In social-accountability projects, 
however, there is a need to merge the contextual perspectives of those experiencing the 
collective action problem and the analysis done by external experts. For those actors in the 
situation, it is part of the process of finding room for manoeuvre through learning by doing to 
know and influence their context where possible.  
  
 A rear-view mirror shows more clearly what is working than does a prediction from the 
original log-frame. Collective action situations are complex and dynamic. 
 
 For a working theory of change, it is more important to keep examining assumptions than to 
develop a neat narrative. Often assumptions, as in log-frames, are sidelined and never 
examined in monitoring and reporting frameworks; yet they can reveal much of the learning 
as well as the fundamental information for managing risks or other ‘killer assumptions’ on a 
given pathway of change.’ (Tembo 2013: 83) 
 
Source: Tembo (2013) 
 
 
 
5  The implications of violence and conflict 
The OECD’s disaggregation of five aspects of fragility highlights the arbitrariness of lumping 
together violence, access to justice, effective and accountable institutions, economic 
inclusion and stability and resilience to shocks. Ideally, each of the five aspects should be 
treated separately, in terms of identifying both endogenous change processes and potential 
external interventions. With respect to E&A, the first category, violence, is perhaps the most 
neglected, despite its far reaching consequences, not least because in FCVAS violence is 
likely to be used to resolve the disagreements and disputes which E&A seeks to resolve. 
 
In practice such discussions as exist on E&A in FCVAS focus much more on fragility than on 
conflict. Violent conflict is frequently conflated with ‘contestation’, and then contestation 
equated with peaceful protest. This may be because of the unacknowledged preferences of 
the non-violent aid actors or the sheer difficulty of working in violent contexts, but the effect 
is to create a divide between those interested in E&A, and those working on conflict, 
violence and peace-building. 
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The turbulence of violent conflict settings poses a huge challenge for external actors; 
endogenous change is likely to be less predictable, is more emergent, and is less 
‘projectable’. Interventions are potentially ‘high risk, high return’, with turbulent settings 
showing less inertia than more stable environments, but with the risks of failure or mistakes 
being far greater, in terms of human suffering. Pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict 
situations all require both understanding and different kinds of response in terms of E&A. 
 
5.1 Erosion of trust 
Issues of trust, risk and fear are prominent in FCVAS. A study of accountability in fragile 
settings in Nepal, Bangladesh and Mozambique found ‘low levels of trust between 
government and citizens and between different citizen groups, a recent history of citizen 
disengagement, high levels of tension or conflict between different groups of citizens, low 
government legitimacy, and weak government capacity to cater to the needs of populations’ 
(McGee and Kroesschell 2012: 35). 
 
One example comes from World Vision in the Central African Republic (CAR). In 2014, 
World Vision began to work with several hundred children and adolescents (8-18 years) 
demobilised from armed groups. Most of them displayed signs of distress, nightmares, some 
social withdrawal, difficulty concentrating and sometimes regression to previous 
developmental behaviours (e.g. bedwetting or thumb-sucking).  
 
World Vision CAR initially started working with a peace clubs project model designed to help 
children and adolescents protect themselves and make good decisions for themselves; treat 
others with respect, tolerance, and peace, and cooperate with others in helping their 
community become a safer and better place for everyone. 
 
However, very soon World Vision realised that most of these children and adolescents were 
so broken and lacking in trust vis-à-vis their parents and community that they needed, in 
addition to safer shelters, access to specialised treatment, income and livelihoods. It 
therefore had to revise its approach to incorporate trauma healing services for those who 
required them (about 1 in 10 of the children and adolescents) (World Vision, pers comm, 
September 2016).  
 
People seeking to hold those in power to account may have well-justified grounds for fear for 
their personal safety. Trust is eroded, and with it social capital, especially the ‘bridging 
capital’ between different social groups divided by class, geography or ethnicity. Even more 
than in non-FCA settings, empowerment may well need to happen before anything 
approaching accountability-claiming can take place.    
 
5.2 Transparency issues 
The heightened risk of promoting E&A in violent settings has important implications for 
external actors. There is an increasing (and welcome) interest in experimentation in non-
fragile settings, ‘doing development differently’, innovating and ‘learning by failing’, but in 
violent contexts, people’s lives can be at risk if things go wrong  (for example if your project 
benefits one social group at the expense of another). ‘Do No Harm’, conflict sensitivity and 
notions of human or community security (Saferworld 2014) become important over-riding 
considerations. 
 
There is also a potential trade-off between promoting E&A and transparency. In Myanmar, 
Oxfam has found that strengthening the social contract is often best done through informal 
mechanisms to build trust. That’s when people can get to know each other, but also 
negotiate and make concessions without losing face. 
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That trade-off can be seen even in a relatively violence-free region of Myanmar – the 
Ayeyarwady Delta. After monitoring local authority budgets and then organising public 
hearings that allowed the population to raise issues with state officials, Oxfam’s CSO 
partners decided to write two reports – a public one, and a private one for local political 
leaders, where issues of corruption were identified. Officials were grateful for the tactful 
approach and took action, with several officials resigning. But it was hardly transparent.7 
 
Many violent conflicts have become entrenched, leading to a situation of multiple co-existing 
state and non-state authorities that challenges conventional approaches to E&A as a 
relationship between citizen and state. In Myanmar, an ethnic armed administration holds 
sway over large parts of the Kachin in the north, while both the national (union) government 
and military are also important and independent power holders. This leads to a more 
complex set of potential accountability lines, as shown in the diagram.8 
 
Figure 5.1: Kachin, Myanmar: lines of accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
 
Of the ten possible accountability lines, five (thick lines) are already being dealt with through 
domestic politics, sometimes with the help of the international community: 
 
1↔4: elections, democracy strengthening etc. 
2↔4: traditional social accountability 
3↔4, 3↔5 and 4↔5: peace process 
 
Two (dotted lines) are very unlikely to happen given the current levels of fear and distrust: 
citizens or CSOs engaging with the military. 
 
That leaves three (thin lines) that have largely slipped below the radar of donor or NGO 
attention: 
 
1↔2: internal accountability of CSOs (except through partner selection) 
1↔3: accountability of ethnic administrations 
2↔3: CSOs acting as independent checks and balances of ethnic administrations 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Author field visit, September 2016 
8  Author field visit, September 2016 https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/do-we-need-to-rethink-social-accountability-thoughts-
 from-myanmar/ 
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5.3 Subnational conflict 
In other regions of Asia, as in Myanmar, subnational conflict is the most widespread, 
enduring, and deadly form of violence. On their own, individual subnational conflicts are 
usually peripheral to national and international concerns. In most cases, they affect only a 
small minority (6.5 per cent of a national population on average), and typically involve less 
than 20 per cent of national territory. However, the overall impact of subnational conflict is 
enormous (Parks et al. 2013). 
 
The majority of subnational conflicts in Asia take place in stable, middle-income countries, 
with relatively strong governments, regular elections, and capable security forces, defying 
conventional wisdom on the relationship between violent conflict, economic development 
and institutional capacity (Parks et al. 2013).  
 
Even though violent conflicts often become entrenched, they are far from static. Various 
typologies exist, such as the one shown below (Brahm 2003). Although individual conflicts 
seldom run smoothly from outbreak to resolution, the typologies help identify the different 
approaches to E&A and trust-building that are required in different contexts. However, they 
are no substitute for a careful analysis of the shifting political, social and economic 
underpinnings of any given conflict. 
 
Figure 5.2: Typology of violent conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brahm, E. (2003) www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-stages. Reproduced with kind permission. 
 
 
Traditional aid programmes have struggled to adjust to the different rhythms and risks of 
violent conflict. In Asia, nearly 88 per cent of aid programmes focus on traditional 
development sectors such as infrastructure, economic development, and service delivery. 
Even in cases where aid is justified on the basis of contributing towards long-term peace and 
security, Parks et al. (2013) show that most programmes use developmental approaches 
and that there is very little evidence of positive impact on conflict dynamics.  
 
The same study highlights the gulf that separates aid agencies’ theory of action from any 
coherent theory of endogenous change. In many cases, the country staff of donor agencies 
and international non-governmental organisations have a sophisticated understanding of the 
drivers of subnational conflict, but actual programmes and aid practice on the ground have 
not kept pace with this increased understanding. This gap can be a product of a) sensitivities 
of the host government, b) conflicting donor government priorities related to aid, trade and 
security, and c) inflexible staffing rules that make it hard for an aid agency’s local and 
international staff to develop expertise on the conflict and be properly compensated and 
promoted for this. 
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The absence of conflict sensitivity in aid programming can have serious consequences. 
Parks et al. (2013: 99) concludes:  
 
There is strong evidence that aid programs are used by local elites to strengthen their 
support networks. In all three country cases, this study found that community members 
were unable to correctly identify the actual source of aid funding; instead most 
attributed projects to local elites, even when they knew that funding came from 
somewhere else. Local elites can dictate the terms of aid project implementation, 
especially the selection of beneficiaries, and also take credit for the benefits of 
projects. This study also found cases where elites have even appropriated aid outputs 
for themselves.  
 
Strengthening local elites can help a transition to peace if it provides a strong 
motivation for powerful local actors to remain committed to the peace process. 
However, this can be a major liability in the long term if it reinforces local dynamics that 
perpetuate conflict. The potential reaction from insurgents is a major factor in aid 
delivery, acceptance and community engagement. 
 
A 2014 graphic from the Institute of Development Studies captures the focus on risk, 
complexity and unpredictability and sets out some useful ‘Principles for Creating a Theory of 
change for those working in contexts of violence and conflict’.9 
 
                                                 
9  www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Working_in_contexts_of_Violence_and_Conflict_IDS_PVCAproject.jpg 
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Source: www.ids.ac.uk/pvca 
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6  Consequences of the distinction between 
theories of change and action: gaps and 
missed opportunities 
This paper argues that, while it is perilous to generalise (especially as the number of 
examples of better practice is growing, some of them discussed in this paper), aid actors 
such as multilateral and bilateral lenders and INGOs tend to conflate how endogenous 
change happens in the social, political and economic system (theory of change) with the 
process of designing their own interventions (theory of action) (see Section 2). One aid 
official observes that there is a strong ToC on external intervention, when there is little solid 
evidence, while on endogenous change, the opposite applies. ‘We should be doing more on 
the endogenous piece’, they conclude (author interview, August 2016). This matters 
because to be effective, actions need to “work with the grain” of the existing system in order 
to be successful. If the ToA is divorced from the reality of the host system, then it will be 
much more likely to fail. 
 
Traditionally, external actors have responded to such points by arguing that understanding of 
the endogenous change process resides with local partners and staff – outsiders can never 
fully grasp the subtleties of domestic change processes. Investment in supporting country-
level learning processes may well be more effective than flying in ‘experts’ to produce yet 
another one-off political economy analysis, but some degree of interest in and familiarity with 
the local context is essential even to select, work with and above all listen to and be guided 
by local partners. 
 
Such an approach is particularly challenging because while aid projects are often fairly linear 
in design (do A to achieve B), the political, social and economic context in which 
endogenous change takes place is much more likely to be a complex system: 
 
Because of the sheer number of relationships and feedback loops among their many 
elements, [complex systems] cannot be reduced to simple chains of cause and effect. 
Think of a crowd on a city street, or a flock of starlings wheeling in the sky at dusk. 
Even with supercomputers, it is impossible to predict the movement of any given 
person or starling, but there is order; amazingly few collisions occur even on the most 
crowded streets. In complex systems, change results from the interplay of many 
diverse and apparently unrelated factors. Those of us engaged in seeking change 
need to identify which elements are important and understand how they interact. 
(Green 2016: 10) 
 
Green (2016) unpacks some of the practical implications of systems thinking. Influencing 
system-wide variables such as norms represents a huge challenge to would-be change 
agents, whether in terms of measurability and attribution, scale (norms tend to be system-
wide attributes that are not easily influenced by tightly focussed interventions), or timescale. 
Change is likely to be innately unpredictable, requiring change agents to move from 
attempted prediction to fast feedback and response – the logic underpinning the recent 
upsurge in interest in adaptive programming methods (Vowles 2013). 
 
Another gulf appears to separate Theories of Action and actual practice. A review of DFID’s 
E&A work in Ghana and Malawi concluded that rather than grapple with the subtleties of a 
well thought-through ToC approach, ‘DFID tends to default to CSO grant-making, which is 
not always the most strategic option’ (ICAI 2013: 1). The weakness of such an approach is 
that rather than develop a theory of action properly rooted in a country context analysis, aid 
programmes follow standardised approaches involving a combination of large civil society 
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grant projects, (scorecards or service delivery), some work on the role of the audit office or 
parliament (e.g. fiscal accountability or open government), some voter/civic education and 
democracy promotion and a push on international transparency standards. 
 
Nor is the inertia exclusively on the side of donors. An analysis of over i1,000 applications 
submitted by civil society groups to the World Bank’s Global Partnership for Social 
Accountability (GPSA) showed that groups put forward just such a standard approach, 
despite efforts from the funder to convey the message that the programme was looking for 
more strategic / politically smart options in response to particular contexts (GPSA undated). 
 
The lack of attention to context matters because such an institutionally self-centred approach 
has led to a series of weaknesses and oversights in the design of interventions, which a 
proper theory of change could help correct. Some of the main categories of gaps and missed 
opportunities are listed below. 
 
6.1 Critical junctures 
Seeing change as a continuous, linear process amenable to the upfront analyses, planning 
and implementation processes of standard aid procedures ignores the role of discontinuous 
change as both opportunity and threat. In ‘Capitalism and Freedom’, Milton Friedman wrote: 
  
Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the 
actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our 
basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and 
available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.  
(Friedman 1962: ix) 
 
Fifty years on, however, the development sector has yet to learn this lesson. Responding to 
critical junctures as windows of opportunity requires: 
 
 Feedback systems to identify such junctures either in advance when they are 
predictable (e.g. elections), as scenarios when they are possibilities (e.g. Brexit) or as 
soon as possible when they are unforeseeable (e.g. the Arab Spring). Natural 
disasters such as the Nepal earthquake or the Asian tsunami are at the unpredictable 
end of the scale, while regular events such as droughts or floods are more 
foreseeable. 
 Management processes that allow for rapid decisions in response to such feedback, 
and the reallocation of staff time and resources in pursuit of windows of opportunity 
that can often be short lived. 
 A network of pre-existing relationships that allows for the rapid construction of change 
coalitions. Such a network between garment retailers, trade unions and NGOs meant 
that within weeks of the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh that killed over 
1,100 people in April 2013, an international ‘Accord on Fire and Building Safety in 
Bangladesh’ was signed and delivered (Green 2016: 18). 
 
Within the aid sector, the world of humanitarian response is probably closest to this model, 
because its operational model is built around rapid response to both rapid onset and slow 
onset shocks. It could be a worthwhile exercise to consider what aspects of humanitarian 
systems could usefully be adapted to promoting E&A or other change objectives in FCVAS, 
and the implications for current theories of action.  
 
Examples of how shock-driven approaches could work come from the rapid establishment of 
citizen helpdesks after the 2015 Nepal Earthquake (Glencorse and Budhathoki 2016) or 
BBC Media Action’s work on governance in Sierra Leone, which argues that ‘the Ebola 
outbreak has increased public demand for accountability and scrutiny over government 
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spending’, even as the initial response ‘damaged already low levels of trust in government 
and services’ (BBC Media Action 2015: 1). 
 
Attempts to promote empowerment and accountability in the wake of shocks need to take on 
board the broader nature of change in complex systems, for example the long term nature of 
change and the need for broad coalitions. Quick wins will only become sustained progress if 
they are implemented, which in turn requires them to be embedded in the grain of the 
society and polity in which they occur (Guerzovich 2012). 
 
6.2 Non-State Actors (NSAs) 
Beyond the rather sparse mental map of many development interventions (populated by 
state, civil society and private sector) lie many different kinds of NSAs (both individuals and 
institutions). These include armed groups, faith organisations, traditional and community 
leadership structures and many others. Hilker (2012: 137) observes ‘Donors often overlook 
non-state and informal institutions that regulate daily life, and it is critical to find ways to work 
with them and link them to the state’. An ODI literature review of the links between gender 
equality, peace-building and state-building concluded:  
 
There is a trend towards engaging with non-state actors... [but] Nevertheless, in 
practice, programming has remained state-centric, and the international community 
continues to struggle with how to operationalise this insight. Questions around risk, 
funding modalities, reporting and accountability remain and need to be addressed 
practically through guidance to programme implementers.  
(Domingo and Denney 2012: 4) 
 
 
Box 6.1: Case study: The Within and Without the State Programme 
The Within and Without the State (WWS) is a five-year DFID-funded global initiative (2011-2016), 
piloting a variety of approaches to working with civil society to promote more accountable 
governance in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.  
 
WWS works in Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories/Israel, South Sudan, DRC, and 
Yemen (although the Yemen programme had to be suspended in 2015 due to the gravity of the 
conflict). 
 
In South Sudan, WWS identified six overarching lessons (Chilvers 2015): 
 
1. Work with existing state structures rather than inventing parallel systems. 
 
Two WWS partners set up grassroots community groups which track state budgets for health, 
education and water from being agreed at national level to the spend in the community itself. CEPO 
(Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation) and SUTCO (Support the Children 
Organisation) realised that provision had been made for accountability groups in South Sudan's 
constitution, but they were not functioning; so they worked to ensure these groups were actually 
operating effectively rather than starting a parallel system. 
 
2. Build gender equality by demonstrating increased economic productivity at the household level, 
and involve the whole community including men and religious leaders. 
 
Challenging gender roles and expectations is a long process. One of WWS' partners APARD 
(African Partnership Aid Rehabilitation and Development) surveyed the amount of work women did 
compared to men. They sought to demonstrate how households could be better off if women had a 
greater say in how the money was invested and spent. They used a multi-pronged approach 
working with key public figures, such as the local bishop, to increase the impact of their message.  
 
(Cont’d.) 
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3. Support women who are already having a positive impact in their communities. 
 
Susan Nadi Majaro, 38, is Paramount Chief of Wulu County in Lakes State - an exceptional 
appointment for a woman in South Sudan. She was elected with support from Oxfam's partner 
APARD in community dialogues and because she was already carrying out invaluable work 
resolving domestic abuse cases in the community court.  
 
4. In peace mediation work, conduct thorough research into the context, involve all those 
concerned in the dispute, but limit the number of actual participants. 
 
In Lakes State, cattle raiding is widespread and violent. Two peace and stability dialogues were 
held between the warring communities. The first involved participants from across the community, 
including local politicians and leaders, but this was found to be counter-productive. So, after 
community consultation and power mapping, the second dialogue got the young people carrying 
out the raids to meet on their own and resolve the situation.  
 
5. Have solid risk management plans and conduct a power analysis, review and update both 
regularly. 
 
Every three months CEPO conducts a power analysis which they share with other CSOs and 
NGOs and parliamentarians for comment. They map institutions or individuals who are influential, 
and identify who is supportive or unsupportive. They use this for particular interventions for 
example in peacebuilding or women's empowerment. They map allies who can potentially bring 
others to support the programme and strategies that can influence them. 
 
6. Develop imaginative ways to explain to communities the change you want to see. 
   
SUTCO decided that making a film using local actors would be a good way to highlight the issues a 
community could face. They recruited actors in an open process and devised scenes where young 
people turned their lives around from drinking and gambling to working on, and monitoring 
community development funds. They asked people what the barriers are to the community 
participating in local government and invited them to come up with possible solutions, and work 
with them to devise an action plan. 
 
Across the overall WWS programme, Oxfam identified the key lessons on building active 
citizenship (Chilvers 2014): 
 
 Create unexpected alliances 
 Apply complexity theory 
 Use the social contract model 
 Work  with women and young people 
 
Sources: Chilvers (2014; 2015). For WWS see http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/our-work/governance-
citizenship/within-and-without-the-state#88cdd4c6-5b24-499e-ad31-0634ed207cb7 
 
In Afghanistan, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) works through local accountability 
mechanisms, such as shuras (community gatherings) and community development councils 
to facilitate elections of volunteer community monitors. These monitors, who are rooted in 
the communities, are then trained to access project information on reconstruction projects 
selected by the communities, survey beneficiaries and assess the reality of projects on the 
ground, thereby contributing to reducing transaction costs and improving delivery of projects 
with considerable budgets (U4 AntiCorruption Resource Centre 2011). 
 
The ODI review argues that aid agencies need to be clear about their objectives: are NSAs 
the target of an intervention, an ally, or both? In either case, engaging usefully requires a set 
of relationships and analytical skills that go beyond those needed to understand the 
workings of formal state institutions. 
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INGOs face a comparable challenge, since their default partners of choice – local NGOs or 
CSOs are often weak or absent in FCVAS. INGOs need to develop their skills in working 
with traditional leaders and organisations, local private sector associations or faith groups. 
Even with more recognisable CSOs, imbalances of power, finance and capacity make truly 
equitable partnerships often a distant dream. Such imbalances are further complicated when 
working with non-CSOs that often do not share the INGOs’ world views or have the 
administrative capacity and formal registration or longevity normally demanded of partners. 
 
This is particularly true of faith organisations, which are often strong and remarkably resilient 
in FCVAS, play a vital role in the construction of social norms (as well as service delivery), 
and have reservoirs of hidden power in terms of the state and other actors. Working with 
faith-based organisations on E&A in FCVAS is a major blind spot for many aid actors – the 
words ‘faith’ or ‘religion’ are conspicuous by their absence in many of the most influential 
policy documents. The 352 pages of the World Bank’s influential Opening the Black Box: 
The Contextual Drivers of Social Accountability book contains just two references to religion, 
and three to faith-based groups (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015).  
 
Faith groups are no freer of corruption or power imbalances than any other institution, and 
some actively promote attitudes and behaviours contrary to notions of empowerment and 
accountability, requiring those wishing to work with them to acquire a full and discriminating 
understanding of their structures and ways of working.  
 
Working with NSAs such as faith groups often requires adapting the traditional tactics and 
language of aid, identifying common ground even when there are serious differences over 
attitudes and beliefs. In their ten country family planning programme, Christian Aid, Plan and 
IHAA found ‘A great deal of cross-over between the interests of Sexual and Reproductive 
Health Rights activists, proponents of healthy birthing and those who focus on socio-
economic gains from population control; often these groups were all supportive of increased 
access to family planning although they may vary widely in religious belief or have widely 
different political and social agendas - the common point of policy suits all their interests and 
enables progress.’ (Christian Aid 2016a: 3) 
 
6.3 Power versus political economy 
Although empowerment and accountability are routinely conjoined, in practice the first term 
receives much less attention than the second, and the conflation of the two has serious 
consequences for work in FCVAS. By ignoring or downplaying many aspects of informal 
power, political economy analyses, the default analytical framework of many donors, further 
weaken the understanding of empowerment within E&A.  
 
Political economy analysis interprets political actions and strategies through the lens of 
economic institutions, focusing on key actors, their interests, and what enables or hinders 
their cooperation. Structures, norms and “rules of the game” are also considered, both 
formal and informal, but with emphasis on those that are visible or explicit.  
 
In contrast, power analysis comes from critical social theory, anthropology, political sociology 
and feminist theory, and is used to explain socialised and internalised norms and behaviour 
and to explore the links between agency and structure. Yet both frameworks share the 
common objective of unpacking the visible, hidden and invisible dimensions of relationships 
between key actors involved in producing (or blocking) meaningful development changes. 
(Acosta and Pettit 2013) A table by Acosta and Pettit (2014) usefully summarises the 
differences. 
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Table 6.1: Three-way comparison of political economy and power analysis 
 Political economy     Power analysis 
Main dimensions of 
power 
Visible Hidden Invisible 
The role of 
institutions/rules of 
the game 
For the most part, 
institutions are taken 
as given or they are 
hard to change in the 
short run 
Emphasis on informal 
institutions often 
resilient to change 
Focus on 
‘structuration’ interplay 
between conscious 
agency and 
internationalisation of 
norms 
Examples of 
institutions 
Formal government 
and National 
Government 
institutions (mayors, 
cabinets, NGOs); 
existing norms and 
regulations 
Informal institutions 
(traditional governance 
structures, militias) 
Social institutions 
(gender norms, ethnic 
identity, etc) and 
networks (kinship, 
political solidarity) 
The role of 
individuals 
Individual, rational 
action. Organisational 
action 
Combine individual 
and collective actions 
through networks 
Focus on individual 
and collective 
consciousness 
(shaped by different 
factors) 
Cooperation and 
contestation 
Collective action is the 
result of individual 
motivations 
Collective action 
results from individual 
motivations and social 
norms 
Collective action 
results from social and 
cultural norms 
Sanctions and 
enforcement 
Formal (legal) ways to 
legitimise agreements 
(contracts) or sanction 
defections 
Informal sanctions 
outside formal legal 
norms, such as bribery 
or coercion 
Fear of exclusion or 
loss of identity, 
internalised social 
norms 
How they explain 
change over time 
(key drivers of 
change) 
Types of actors, 
preferences and 
strategies change but 
institutional change is 
much slower (‘Change 
from above’?) 
Greater trust in agency 
to change power 
relations (‘Change 
from below’?) 
Changes in critical 
awareness and sense 
of empowerment 
leading to growth in 
agency (‘Change from 
within’?) 
Example: how to 
ensure effective 
service delivery from 
local governments? 
What are the legal, 
political and financial 
resources allocated to 
local governments? 
Who performs local 
government functions 
in practice? Power 
operates ‘behind the 
scenes’ 
Who is neglected from 
local governments or 
does not benefit from 
delivery of services, 
and why? 
Sample 
recommendations 
emerging from 
analysis 
Influence policymaking 
through political 
advocacy and seeking 
access to formal 
decision-making 
Strengthen and 
empower 
organisations, build 
collective leadership, 
raise the visibility of 
issues, mobilise new 
voices 
Raise consciousness 
to transform the way 
people perceive 
themselves and those 
around them 
Source: Acosta and Pettit (2014: 14) 
 
6.4 Gender gap 
The citizenry is not, of course, homogeneous. Experiences of empowerment and 
disempowerment differ according to social status and group identity, notably along the 
faultline of gender. This is often acknowledged in passing, but fails to feed through into the 
subsequent analysis and action. For example, a review of DFID’s approach to inclusive 
political and economic institutions concluded that the political settlements approach, which is 
the most influential evidence base used by DFID, ‘is gender blind’ (Piron 2015). 
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Oxfam uses the Rao-Kelleher framework (see Figure 6.1, based on Rao et al. 1999) as a 
typology for considering the relative importance of formal and informal power and structures 
in different contexts, and the relationship between them. The conclusion from the literature is 
that compared to non-fragile settings, the left hand side is particularly important in FCVAS, 
because empowerment starts in the deeper recesses of informal identity, relationships and 
institutions, long before it emerges into the formal sphere that often dominates discussions 
of accountability (Oxfam 2011). 
 
Figure 6.1: Rao-Kelleher framework 
 
Source: Based on Rao et al. 1999 
 
Gender blindness is particularly unfortunate because in terms of empowerment, one perhaps 
unexpected feature of critical junctures is the enhanced role of women in post-conflict 
countries. A study of 17 African countries showed that those emerging from major conflict 
were quicker to advance women’s rights and elect women to political office than less conflict-
affected countries (Tripp 2015). However, while participation in formal politics increases, 
numerous barriers to substantive participation remain,  including customary rules, negative 
cultural attitudes, male- and elite-dominated political parties and structures, lack of financial 
resources for women, violence and insecurity, the effect of backlash reactions, illiteracy and 
political inexperience and lack of support for capacity building (Domingo et al. 2013). 
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6.5 Positive deviance 
Thinking in terms of systems and endogenous change highlights the value of approaches 
that move away from out->in interventions in favour of more rigorous attention to context. 
One such approach is positive deviance, which capitalises on the fact that for any given 
problem, someone in the community will usually have already identified a solution. As 
developed by Monique and Jerry Sternin, the approach consists of first identifying these 
positive outliers, and then encouraging a process of social learning in which the wider 
community studies, adapts and adopts the approaches that have led to the deviance. The 
approach has a track record on everything from child malnutrition in Vietnam to MRSA in US 
hospitals (Pascale et al. 2010).  
 
The Sternins argue that positive deviance comes into its own when other, more conventional 
interventions have failed, suggesting a clear relevance to E&A in FCVAS, yet as far as the 
author is aware, no donors have reported supporting or promoting positive deviance 
approaches in this area. One example comes from Oxfam’s work in the Eastern DRC, where 
a researcher documented examples of better-than-average treatment of civilians by security 
forces and concluded: 
 
The actual behaviour of the [army] towards civilians differs from place to place, and 
there are various ways that it could contribute to enhancing civilians’ safety. Through 
local-level initiatives, military units and their immediate civilian environment adjust 
themselves to work with each other, and may develop mutually beneficial practices 
that can make a difference for civilians’ safety. The challenge is to seize upon existing 
‘bottom-up’ initiatives, value, spread and institutionalise them, and sustain them 
through high-level policies.  
(Oxfam 2012: 37) 
Box 6.2: Case study: Community Protection Committees (CPCs) in the DRC 
In the Eastern Congo (DRC), Oxfam is working through local NGOs to establish and support 
Community Protection Committees (CPCs) made up of six men and six women elected by their 
villages in conflict-affected communities. They identify the main threats and actions to mitigate 
them. When people are forced to flee renewed fighting, these committees are often instrumental in 
getting people organised in their new refugee camps. 
A ‘women’s forum’ is also established to focus on protection issues that particularly affect women. 
In addition, ‘change agents’ are elected from further remote villages or locations, in order to expand 
the geographical impact of the CPC’s work. 
 
An external evaluation of Oxfam’s DRC programme found that successes cited by committee 
members were not always recognised or agreed with by other community members; likewise, 
measuring a concept as complex as ‘empowerment’ – which includes subjective feelings of self-
worth and confidence – is never easy. However, feedback from communities, including statistical 
data, has identified some tangible positive changes. It also suggests that the broader approach to 
gender – recognising the impact of conflict on men, and not just in an instrumental way to improve 
the situation for women – has brought about positive results, strengthening women’s feelings of 
security and empowerment. 
 
The CPC work is an approach, rather than a prescribed programme, so allows communities to 
adapt to events – it focuses on shifting local dynamics and feeds off that. It builds adaptive 
capacity, much like climate change adaptation work. By not tying the project to a clear ‘sector’, the 
programme was able to be flexible and adapt to fit the context, guided by what people said worked. 
By cultivating a culture of dialogue as opposed to confrontation, both sides have begun to 
understand one another, finding ways to generate solutions together. In chaotic and complex 
environments, working on relationships may be more feasible than trying to target specific 
outcomes. 
Source: Green 2015: 2, 8, 11 
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The kinds of ‘bottom-up initiatives’ that surfaced in the study included a scheme whereby 
small traders arranged with the local commander to request that credit they gave to soldiers 
was directly deducted from the soldiers’ salaries and repaid to the traders. This allowed 
soldiers to continue to feed their families during crises (for example when wages were not 
paid) and so reduced the pressure on them to impose ‘taxes’ or steal (Oxfam 2012). 
 
 
7  Are these gaps an accident? Obstacles 
created by the aid business model 
It would be unacceptable in a paper on theories of change to assume that aid actors’ 
reluctance or inability to give due weight to endogenous change in current approaches is 
merely due to ignorance or oversight. One way to explore ‘how change doesn’t happen’ – 
i.e. the obstacles to what seem otherwise sensible policies or behaviours, is to disaggregate 
ideas, interests and institutions (Green 2016). In this respect, it would seem the case that 
while ideas (ignorance, lack of historical perspective, shortfalls in research) may be partly to 
blame, it is hard to see what major interests are served by the status quo.  
 
Instead, this paper argues that the major obstacle is institutional. Exploring theories of 
endogenous change brings into stark relief some of the limitations created by the business 
models of a range of aid actors. According to the World Bank’s Shantayanan Devarajan and 
Stuti Khemani ‘the traditional mode of development assistance—the investment project—
was based on overcoming market failures. That mode has not proved to be effective when 
the problem was government failure’ (Devarajan and Khemani 2016: 19). 
 
Some challenges of the aid business model include: 
 
Political Economy of Aid: Aid is a political construct, requiring agreement from donor 
publics and governments, which in turn generate a number of pressures that can run counter 
to attempts to ‘do development differently’. Notably, the increasing tendency to tie aid overtly 
to the national commercial interest of the donor country, pressure to demonstrate tangible 
results and/or ‘value for money’ for ‘our aid’ and pretensions to ‘zero tolerance’ of corruption 
can all combine to produce a risk averse, short termist and conservative mindset that is 
poorly suited to taking risks and ‘working with the grain’ of local political and social contexts. 
 
Structures and Siloes: The conventional division of aid activities is into ‘humanitarian’, ‘long 
term development’ and their smaller relation ‘influencing’. Work in conflict settings 
traditionally ‘belongs’ to humanitarian staff and agencies who, while arguably more willing to 
respond to shocks and work in an iterative, adaptive manner, are traditionally less aware of 
(or even averse to) issues of power, politics, systems thinking and long term change in areas 
such as norms. Language is also treacherous and silo-specific: accountability in the context 
of humanitarian aid (e.g. beneficiary feedback mechanisms) and empowerment in the 
context of survivors of crises are qualitatively different in their meaning and wider impact 
than general ‘accountability’ or empowerment of non-traumatised non-post-crisis citizens.  
 
Staffing: It is hard to maintain a deep political knowledge of non-state actors, who are often 
very localised, when donor offices are located in capitals with staff changing every few years 
(Domingo et al. 2013). Responses include giving greater priority to recruiting, developing 
and promoting local staff who both have a deeper understanding of local context, and are 
less likely to leave after two years. However, in FCVAS, such skills are often in short supply, 
and the risks inherent in such contexts can make taking on such roles less desirable, 
especially if staff have family members to consider (Oxfam 2014b).  
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Institutional Amnesia: Staff turnover within FCVAS is one contributor to a wider problem – 
the lack of institutional memory about any given context, which is also exacerbated by short 
funding cycles and the move to using a shifting band of management consultants in project 
implementation. Aid agencies might be able get round these barriers by establishing long-
lasting links with ‘knowledge brokers’ with deep knowledge of different contexts (e.g. retired 
politicians and civil servants, or local universities and think tanks), but there is little evidence 
of this happening on anything beyond informal conversations. 
 
Tension with recent trends in aid: The analysis of how change happens in E&A in FCVAS 
suggests that donors should support adaptive projects whose outcomes are not entirely 
foreseeable in advance, and work ‘with the grain’ based on an in-depth understanding of the 
evolving local context, with an end goal of supporting the emergence of resilient, 
accountable institutions. There are tensions between this approach, and recent trends such 
as reduction in headcount or the push to demonstrate immediate and tangible results. 
 
Timeline: There is a clear disconnect between humanitarian funding cycles measured in 
months rather than years, and the idea that transitions to E&A in FCVAS take ‘at least a 
generation’.  
 
The structure of funding: A ‘working with the grain’ approach based on learning by doing 
(and failing) often requires the placing of multiple ‘small bets’, rather than going straight into 
developing ‘monolithic’ large scale projects (they can follow once the small bets have been 
placed, and the results understood). Donors may need to find ways to follow a ‘venture 
capitalist’ route in some situations, funding a number of small start-ups rather than a single 
flagship. Programmes like SAVI in Nigeria (see page 40) provide examples of the kind of 
intermediary project that can achieve this. 
 
But small grants can sometimes kill innovation because there is inadequate staffing, support 
costs, and, for the staff involved, livelihoods depend on the perceived success of that 
project, so it hampers honest reflection and the idea that it's acceptable to fail and reshape. 
According to Maria Poli of the World Bank’s GPSA:  
 
The experience from 3 plus years is still inconclusive. On the one hand, larger grants 
enabled lead applicant CSOs to partner with others, in some cases, large civil society 
groups, particularly groups working at the sub-national level, oftentimes non-traditional 
actors (thus ensuring they receive adequate funding for their work).   
 
On the other hand, while large grants have given them more stability in terms of long-
term planning, it was apparent that only a handful have already integrated adaptive 
management. So without the incentive to learn by doing and be open to course 
correct, the long-large grants don’t necessarily work (unless you invest in supporting 
adaptive management during implementation).  
 
But the issue seems more about the conditions under which these grants are 
structured more than about the size of grants.  
 
(Maria Poli, pers comm, September 2016) 
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8  How have theories of change and action on 
E&A in FCVAS changed over time? 
Most of the relevant intellectual activity around theories of change and action over the last 20 
years has not been directly on E&A in FCVAS. Nor has it been explicitly framed in terms of 
theories of change or action. Instead, there has been a rich discussion on institutional reform 
and governance, which has included looking at fragile, conflict and violence affected 
settings. 
 
8.1 Empowerment  
In terms of E&A, since the early 2000s, there has been a considerable investment in 
analysis and policy advice on accountability, but much less activity on the issue of 
empowerment. According to at least one critic, this has been partly because the concept of 
‘empowerment' was tamed and robbed of its meaning once imported into the mainstream 
development lexicon from the more radical feminist fringes where it originated. And indeed, it 
is in the area of gender rights and feminism that the most searching thinking on 
empowerment has continued in recent years (Cornwall 2000). 
One exception is a systematic review by Westhorp et al. (2014), which explores the 
relationship between empowerment and accountability in relation to education. Its theory of 
change is shown below, with empowerment disaggregated into the five categories in the left 
hand column, feeding into a process of accountability as shown. 
 
Figure 8.1: Westhorp et al. conceptual model: the relationship between empowerment 
and accountability 
 
 
Source: Westhorp et al. (2014) © EPPI-Centre. 
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Information refers to all the varieties of information, both from the state and generated 
locally; in relation to rights, entitlements, budgets, expenditure, student-learning 
outcomes and so on.  
Spaces refers to the social spaces in which people come together to identify their 
concerns, deliberate and develop strategies.  
Norms and beliefs refers to the cultural perspectives, norms in relation to education, 
attitudes and aspirations of communities, and understandings of roles and 
responsibilities for communities and the state that shape the specific demands 
communities seek to make, community cohesion in relation to those demands, and the 
propensity of communities to make demands.  
Knowledge and skills refers to the capacities of local communities, identified primarily 
in terms of adult literacy, knowledge of the local community, understandings of 
information, and skills to plan, manage, and advocate on their own behalves  
Time refers both to available time after survival needs and other social roles are 
fulfilled to participate in accountability initiatives, and to the passage of time - change 
does not happen quickly, and years may be required for significant change to be 
achieved.  
(Westhorp et al. 2014: 125-6) 
 
Despite this exception, and recognising that there is considerable tacit knowledge among 
staff, the absence of donor and practitioner literature on empowerment (or indeed power 
itself) is striking, both in terms of general literature and that in specific connection to FCVAS. 
Standard political economy analyses cover economic power, formal political power, and an 
element of ‘behind the scenes’ hidden power, but largely ignore issues of ‘power within’ and 
‘power with’ that underpin successful citizen action (Rowlands 1997). These topics have 
been most developed in gender rights literature, for example in Rao and Kelleher’s work 
(Rao et al. 2016), discussed on page 30-1.   
 
8.2 Accountability and ‘good governance’ 
In contrast, there has been a good deal of discussion and insight on accountability, for 
example in democracy promotion, or open government, but again with little examination of 
FCVAS. The 38-page strategy document for the international ‘Making All Voices Count’ 
transparency and accountability initiative contains no mention of the words ‘fragile’, ‘fragility’ 
or ‘conflict’ (Brock et al. 2014). The lack of overlap between FCVAS and E&A analyses 
underlines the importance of the A4EA research programme of which this paper is part.  
 
‘Good Governance’ as a donor theme emerged in the early 1990s, during a period of 
optimism after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The initial good governance agenda was dominated 
by generic ‘best practice’ approaches based on the governance systems of advanced 
economies. Among donors, the World Bank is the undisputed thought leader in this area, 
with significant contributions from DFID and others. According to Brian Levy, a key figure in 
the evolution of World Bank governance approaches: 
 
There was something truly extraordinary about coming up with a comprehensive 
governance reform program for low income countries by describing the characteristics 
of the world’s most affluent and open societies and then reverse engineering them.... A 
breathtaking combination of naivete and amnesia.  
(Levy 2014: 7) 
 
Governance approaches were also heavily supply-led: advice and training for governments 
(both political leaders and officials) on the (often implicit) assumption that the problem was 
one of capacity, rather than of power and politics.  
36 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the supply-led approach failed in situations where power and politics were 
not aligned with the suggestions of donors, and the 2004 World Development Report (World 
Bank 2004) triggered a major shift towards demand-led approaches, particularly among 
INGOs and some bilateral agencies (e.g. DFID), stimulating citizen demand for services and 
accountability. The WDR’s lasting contribution has been its description of two routes to 
accountability (see Figure 8.2): the short route (where services are made directly 
accountable to citizens, for example through citizens’ report cards) and the long route 
(boosting accountability through the formal political system). The result was a large number 
of short route schemes, and schemes to promote transparency and access to information as 
a way of stoking demand for better services. 
 
Figure 8.2: The overall accountability triangle: four relationships of accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pritchett (2013) www.slideshare.net/Development_Analytics/lant-pritchettankarapresentationdevelopmentanalytics1, 
adapted from World Bank (2003) World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5986. Reproduced with kind permission. 
 
 
While demand-led approaches were more politically realistic than a largely managerialist 
supply-led model, they have since been criticised on several counts: they frame users as 
individuals rather than as collective actors (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015), and they fail to 
recognise the very real capacity constraints within state systems that undermine even the 
best intentions. In East Africa, for example, the innovative NGO Twaweza’s rigorous 
approach to monitoring and evaluation has revealed that major efforts on access to 
information (for example on quality of education) have failed to produce improvements.10 
                                                 
10  http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/the-war-for-twawezas-soul-the-hunger-for-clarity-and-certainty-v-the-demands-of-
 complexity/  
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The evidence on impact was both scant and disillusioning. Reviews devoted at least as 
much time to describing the limitations of the evidence as to synthesising the results 
(Buffardi et al. 2017: 14). In a 2011 review of 80 countries receiving World Bank support for 
public sector reform, the quality of public administration was higher after reforms in only 13 
per cent (and actually fell in a similar number). Matt Andrews, from Harvard University, has 
criticised the tendency for governments to placate donors through ‘isomorphic mimicry’: 
governments and organisations pretending to reform by changing what policies or 
organisations look like rather than what they actually do (Andrews 2013). 
 
A review by Haider (2016: 4) concluded that:  
 
these interventions have often been compartmentalised based on a traditional state-
civil society divide. Strategies and policies are needed that focus on the interaction 
between institutions and citizens at all stages of war-to-peace transition.  
 
The 2011 World Development Report argues that a combination of low trust and low state 
capacity makes promoting E&A in FCVAS difficult, but possible: 
 
Given the difficulties, how have countries escaped from violence and achieved 
institutional resilience? These pathways are under-researched, and this report has only 
some of the answers. The [WDR] framework suggests some fundamental differences 
between fragile and violent situations and stable developing environments. The first is 
the need to restore confidence in collective action before embarking on wider 
institutional transformation. Second is the priority of transforming institutions that 
provide citizen security, justice, and jobs. Third is the role of regional and international 
action to reduce external stresses. Fourth is the specialised nature of external support 
needed.  
(World Bank 2011: 103) 
 
Figure 8.3: WDR framework: repeated cycles of action to bolster institutional 
resilience 
The WDR framework is presented as an ever-expanding spiral because these processes 
repeat over time as countries go through multiple transitions. Even as one set of immediate 
priorities is resolved, other risks and transition moments emerge and require a repeated 
cycle of action to bolster institutional resiliency. The arrow below the spiral illustrates that 
external support and incentives can help this nationally led process, and the arrow above 
illustrates how external stresses can derail it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. World Bank. © World Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO, reproduced with kind permission. 
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Recent attempts to move beyond the supply/demand dichotomy have focussed on a range 
of approaches that bring different players together in search of locally relevant solutions to 
‘collective action problems’. Matt Andrews is piloting an approach known as ‘Programme 
Driven Iterative Adaptation’ (Andrews 2013), while at the Overseas Development Institute, 
David Booth, Susan Unsworth and Diana Cammack have promoted ‘politically smart, locally-
led’ approaches that focus on creating hybrid solutions that marry local traditions with new 
thinking (‘good fit’ rather than ‘best practice’) (Booth and Cammack 2013; Booth and 
Unsworth 2014). These approaches are echoed in the NGO world in the rising importance of 
multi-stakeholder initiatives and ‘convening and brokering’11 at both national and subnational 
level.  
 
While these new approaches appear promising, aspects of them can be criticised on two 
grounds: firstly, their evidential basis thus far is weak, amounting to little more than a handful 
of case studies. Secondly, while they tackle the issue of accountability and institution-
building, their focus is often drawn towards political settlements and elite bargains. They are 
sketchy in their understanding of the nature of empowerment, and how it emerges and can 
be strengthened by external intervention. Piron’s 2015 scoping paper on inclusive political 
and economic institutions concluded that:  
 
A shortcoming of the political settlements approach (as exemplified by Khan 2010 or 
North et al. 2009) is that it tends to over-emphasise the role of elites and take a narrow 
view of political settlements, as inter-elite bargaining rather than looking at the 
character of state-society relations and the whole social contract. This literature also 
gives little room for agency, ideology, political culture and other factors that shape 
political choice and action, beyond a rational-choice model of interest-based bargains. 
(Piron 2015: 7)  
 
As discussed in Section 6, these approaches have also been criticised for being almost 
entirely blind to the gendered dimensions of empowerment and accountability. Moreover, it is 
not clear how much of this new thinking can be applied in FCVAS, without considerable 
adaptation. 
 
Discussions linking ‘empowerment’ and ‘accountability’ are less well developed, perhaps 
because the two concepts tend to draw on different disciplines for their language and 
understanding.  
 
Box 8.1: Case study: The State Accountability and Voice Initiative, Nigeria The State  
Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) is a DFID-funded empowerment and accountability 
programme in Nigeria. SAVI puts into practice two emerging schools of thought – systems thinking 
(Ramalingam 2013) and the ‘politically smart, locally led’ approach to development (Booth and 
Unsworth 2014). 
Unlike most E&A programmes, SAVI does not call for proposals, and does not provide CSOs with 
grants or organisational development. Instead, SAVI recruits and invests in training and supporting 
in-house state teams, made up of staff from diverse backgrounds and indigenous to the state, to 
facilitate locally driven change. A national team of resident technical advisers (TA), supported by a 
small team of international TA, provide continuous hands-on mentoring and support to state teams.  
SAVI supports what Fox (2015) refers to as both ‘voice’ (citizen action) and ‘teeth’ (government 
capacity to respond to voice). Its theory of change (actually its theory of action), consists of six 
stages: 
(Cont’d). 
                                                 
11  http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/convening-and-brokering-in-practice-sorting-out-tajikistans-water-problem/ 
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Stage 1: Glass half full: The starting point for the SAVI programme in any state – the inception 
phase – is for state teams to recognise that they are looking for and dealing with a ‘glass half full’. 
SAVI state teams analyse the political economy of the state and of specific sub-sectors and issues. 
They aim to identify issues or processes that have traction both with state governments and with 
citizens, and build on existing momentum for change both in the state government and in wider 
society. Potential partners, with demonstrable passion and credibility, are identified through these 
processes. 
Stage 2: House: The first stage of support to partners is enabling them to ‘get their own house in 
order’. This includes consideration of their links and accountability to citizens; their evidence-base; 
their ability to work in partnership with others; their ability to harness their own networks, 
knowledge, skills and resources and build these as required; and their ability to understand and 
work with the politics and power dynamics surrounding their issue of concern.  
Stage 3: Triangle: The next stage is to break down barriers and build bridges between groups of 
citizens, their elected state level representatives and the media. Existing partnerships are 
strengthened, and new partnerships, platforms and broad alliances organically emerge.  
Stage 4: Bridge: This stage is about facilitating constructive engagement between demand-side 
partners and the state government. Partners are supported to operate in a politically savvy way. 
This includes appreciating the complexity of actors and processes involved; understanding the 
policy, planning and budget processes they are seeking to influence; and identifying entry points. 
Partners are supported to forge alliances and working relations with key actors within the 
government; build their case, frame their arguments and marshal their evidence to influence 
change simultaneously at multiple levels. They plan in incremental stages through learning by 
doing and reflection, focusing on short-term achievable targets and building the confidence and 
credibility to take on bigger challenges.  
Stage 5: Wedge: SAVI encourages partners to adapt new approaches they have found to be 
effective to their lobbying work on other issues, in other sectors, and in neighbouring states, to tell 
others and share their story. The effectiveness of SAVI partners in achieving results also attracts 
the attention of other demand and supply side actors.  
Stage 6: Explosion: The final stage of the theory of change is to push forward to a ‘critical mass’ of 
citizens, media companies, State Houses of Assembly and government officials who are actively 
engaged in participatory, responsive and inclusive governance. 
 
Source: Derbyshire et al. 2016: 8 (Crown Copyright) 
 
Fox (2015) distinguishes a number of different frameworks that have been used by the 
World Bank over the last decade, influencing the wider aid community’s framing of the 
issues. Two of them were captured in the WDR 2004: the principal-agent (P-A) framework, 
and the long route versus short route to accountability (World Bank 2004). Imported from 
orthodox economics, the P-A approach became the conventional wisdom in mainstream 
development thinking, assuming that citizens are ultimately the principals - regardless of 
whether or not they actually live under representative forms of government. ‘When applied to 
governance, the P-A framework implicitly assumes what it needs to demonstrate – that 
citizens are indeed ultimately in charge - the ‘principals’’ (Fox 2015: 11). Moreover, this 
approach often makes the assumption that citizens have relatively homogenous interests 
and goals, something that is clearly not the case in many FCVAS (or arguably, anywhere 
else). Fox also criticises the short-route-long-route framework, partly because in practice, 
short route accountability requires functioning long route systems. 
 
By the latter part of the first decade of the 2000s, official World Bank documents began to 
promote a third discursive frame for accountability issues, deploying the market metaphors 
that contrast “supply” and “demand” for good governance. Fox concedes that:  
 
In contrast to the 2004 WDR, this approach does emphasise the potential contribution 
of checks and balances-type institutions, which fit under the “supply side” (anti-
corruption bureaus, open budgeting, legislative oversight capacity-building, grievance 
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review mechanisms, etc.). Yet the market metaphor implies that somehow demand will 
create its own supply, or vice versa. Moreover, the implicit assumption that an invisible 
hand would bring them together is unrealistic.  
(Fox 2015: 12) 
 
Fox concludes that, ‘Each of these four broad conceptual frameworks has their own 
strengths and limitations, yet they do not direct us to the kind of analytical tools that are 
needed’ (2015: 13). He sets out his own suggestion for such analytical tools – the distinction 
between tactical and strategic approaches to E&A – in his paper in this series (Fox 2016). 
 
However, the Bank’s Maria Poli12 argues that Fox’s stress on supply and demand is 
misplaced: 
 
‘While the market metaphors were indeed used, the approach put forth by the 2007 
GAC (Governance and Anticorruption) Strategy – contrary to what Fox implies - 
actually meant to integrate supply and demand side interventions. This would be done 
by including PEA (political economy analysis) in operations and assessing how state 
and non-state actors could be supported –in a complementary manner- to advance 
governance reforms.  
 
Moreover, the approach also underlined the need to facilitate (broker, support, foster) 
spaces of interaction between supply and demand, and the understanding of reform 
coalitions as cutting across the state-civil society divide. 
 
In this sense, the 2007 GAC Strategy for the first time acknowledged that the Bank 
needed to change the way it approached engagement with NSAs, including through 
more politically savvy engagement.   
   
Evaluations of the GAC strategy show that the limitations of its implementation weren’t 
so much about the framework in itself but rather determined by organisational design 
and business model issues.’  
 
(Maria Poli, pers comm, October 2016) 
 
According to Poli, that approach is central to the role of the GPSA (Global Partnership for 
Social Accountability), which ‘emerges in 2012 (after trial, reflection, adaptation) as a 
stakeholder that aims to help broker relationships between supply, demand, and the World 
Bank in Operations’ (Poli pers comm).  
 
The GPSA set out its ‘theory of change’ (actually a theory of action) in its 2015 ‘Results 
Framework’ (GPSA 2015: 3-4): 
 
Through its grant making and its knowledge and learning activities, the GPSA seeks to 
(1) increase constructive engagement between civil society actors and government 
decision makers in the executive responsible for improved service delivery; and (2) 
facilitate collaboration between the social accountability initiatives of civil society actors 
and state institutions of accountability (sometimes also referred to as “horizontal” or 
“independent” institutions of accountability) for overseeing actors in the executive 
responsible for service delivery. These are the two main outcomes of the GPSA’s 
theory of change [...] Rather than focusing solely on bottom-up citizen action, these 
two outcomes help to “close the loop” between state-society interactions by 
encouraging government responsiveness to citizens and civil society actors on citizen 
preferences for public service delivery and citizen demands for better governmental 
performance. 
                                                 
12  Maria Poli, pers comm, October 2016, see also World Bank 2012. 
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9  The current state of thinking on theories of 
action  
The analysis in preceding sections clearly indicates some potential areas of engagement for 
external actors through their theories of action. The focus on context demands greater 
analytical skills, and regular analysis of ongoing shifts in the context; working with non-state 
actors, sub-national state tiers and informal power entails a shift from traditional aid donors’ 
focus on national governments; the importance of critical junctures heightens the need for 
fast feedback and response mechanisms; and changing social norms and working on 
generation-long shifts requires new thinking about the tools and methods of engagement of 
the aid community. 
 
But the analysis also engenders a good deal of scepticism and caution about the potential 
for success, so while some advocate for more detailed political engagement, others argue 
for pulling back to a limited focus on the ‘enabling environment’ for E&A, principally through 
transparency and access to information. A third option makes the ‘both/and’ case for an 
optimal combination of direct intervention and enabling environment approaches. 
 
9.1 Explore the assumptions 
At a more ‘meta’ level, the chastening record of failure in governance and empowerment and 
accountability programmes (Andrews 2013; Levy 2014), and a deeper understanding of 
issues of power and systems approaches has revived interest in the assumptions that, often 
implicitly, underpin E&A interventions.  
 
There is a case for using a much more fine-grained analysis and typology of assumptions. 
This would allow external actors to link their theories of action to an underlying theory(ies) of 
endogenous change, both as a starting point and as the basis for subsequent evaluation and 
learning about emerging ToAs. 
 
In her guide to ToCs, Irene Guijt identifies a typology of three kinds of assumptions 
particularly relevant to ToCs (Hivos 2015: 24): 
 
1. Assumptions about the context and the actors and factors at play  
2. Assumptions related to the pathways of change  
3. Assumptions related to conditions for and quality of implementation  
 
Making such assumptions explicit and then testing them through debate and action is a 
central part of the ToC approach. A review by Care International UK of 19 peacebuilding 
projects in three conflict-affected countries found that the process of articulating and 
reviewing theories of change adds rigour and transparency, clarifies project logic, highlights 
assumptions that need to be tested, and helps identify appropriate participants and partners. 
(Care International UK 2012).  
 
Care’s ToC for ‘Inclusive Governance in Fragile Settings’ sets out 12 underlying assumptions 
including, for example ‘CSOs are instrumental for excluded groups to influence policies on 
their behalf’ and ‘Accountability interventions shift power relations in favour of excluded 
groups’ (Care International UK, undated). It should be noted however, that numerous 
assumptions in turn lie hidden within these assumptions, for example that excluded groups 
are sufficiently homogeneous to be represented by CSOs and have shared and common 
interests in the first place, or that CSOs are willing and able to represent the interests of 
excluded groups. 
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Moreover, although initially at the heart of the logical framework approach, the discussion of 
assumptions had become increasingly perfunctory prior to the new surge in interest in ToCs. 
Aid actors are not disinterested ‘philosopher kings’ in such discussions. Assumptions contain 
worldviews that drive business models and vice-versa. For example, it seems unlikely that 
aid agencies will arrive at the conclusion that ‘out → in’ interventions are the wrong way to 
proceed, and instead argue that E&A are more likely to emerge through endogenous 
change, with outsiders deliberately staying on the sidelines. 
 
9.2 Context is all 
The focus on the importance and variety of contexts in shaping E&A engagement echoes the 
themes of ‘Working with the Grain’ (Levy 2014) and the limits on external actors’ ability to 
effect institutional reform (Andrews 2013). These books, along with a body of work from the 
ODI (see for example Booth and Cammack 2013) and others, have given rise to a wider 
rethink of governance programming, reflected in the names of two networks of donors and 
researchers – Doing Development Differently (DDD)13 and Thinking and Working Politically 
(TWP)1415. 
 
The DDD and TWP networks agree on the necessity of external actors understanding and 
involving themselves in the local political and social context, rather than attempting to 
introduce standard templates or ‘best practice’. That includes detailed political economy 
analysis, an emphasis on ‘hybrid institutions’ that build on existing traditions, and seeing 
engagement as an exercise in iterative, adaptive management rather than the execution of a 
pre-determined plan. A recent DFID/World Bank funded call for 5 year proposals on ‘Global 
Learning on Adaptive Management’ could be a sign of future directions in this field.16 A 
recent example of ‘Working With the Grain’ thinking is the World Bank’s 2015 book on social 
accountability (SA), which in its chapter on FCAS (fragile and conflict affected settings), 
concluded: 
 
SA approaches in general, but perhaps even more so in FCASs, need to build on 
existing structures and local priorities and norms. SA approaches based on organic 
structures and initiated by local stakeholders themselves tend to be the most 
successful… [They] need to be adapted and adjusted constantly to the complex and 
fluid local environment, perhaps more so than in any other context.  
(Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 215, 16) 
 
Similarly, McLean-Hilker et al. (2010) argue that external actors must gain a detailed and 
nuanced understanding of local power dynamics and actors, particularly the complex 
relationships between violent and non-violent actors, and between everyday violence and 
political violence. Interventions should build on existing sources of resilience, ‘safe spaces’ 
and structures for change.  
 
When generic ToCs are applied on the ground, a good deal of adaptation is required. In the 
inception phase of a ten country family planning programme, Christian Aid, Plan and IHAA 
found that  
 
some programmes and partners struggled to interpret the global theory of change, 
which focused largely on advocacy and accountability, to their own most obvious 
problems which were more related to the lack of sensitisation and awareness, 
                                                 
13  http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/ 
14  www.dlprog.org/research/thinking-and-working-politically-community-of-practice.php 
15  For an overview of the different initiatives in the field of adaptive management, see http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/where-
 have-we-got-to-on-adaptive-learning-thinking-and-working-politically-doing-development-differently-etc-getting-
 beyond-the-peoples-front-of-judea/w 
16 https://supplierportal.dfid.gov.uk/selfservice/pages/public/supplier/publicbulletin/viewPublicNotice.cmd?bm90aWNlS
 WQ9NjY4ODA%3D 
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resistance from traditional community leaders but also to the low capacity of 
government department and service providers.  
(Christian Aid 2016a: 4) 
 
A dichotomy between universal best practice and ‘every context is different’ is not helpful for 
practitioners, who need help with finding ‘good bets’ in terms of approaches and models, that 
they can then test and adapt to the specific context. Typologies can be helpful in narrowing 
down the range of options without doing violence to the importance of context. 
 
However, other voices in the World Bank, along with other researchers and practitioners in 
the two networks, are less sanguine. They see a number of particular difficulties about 
external actors promoting E&A in FCVAS. 
 
FCVAS are characterised by social fragmentation, low levels of trust, and weak state 
capacity and/or legitimacy. Civil society may lack leadership and have limited access to 
information or means of communication. Under these circumstances, mobilising citizens or 
engaging them in formal accountability mechanisms may be premature: ‘the people who 
benefit are often the most literate, the least geographically isolated, and the most connected 
to the wealthy and powerful’ (Mansuri and Rao 2013: 6); it can exacerbate inequality by 
being viewed as a challenge to the state (Schouten 2011). Widening the gap between the 
state and citizens in this way puts the latter at real risk of violence and persecution (Rowland 
and Smith 2014). 
 
A recent World Bank overview of social accountability (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015) argued that 
all three linking mechanisms between citizen and state – civic mobilisation, the citizen-state 
interface, and access to information, are harder to achieve in fragile contexts, and expanded 
on the range of potential risks: 
 
If the process and impact of SA are perceived to be excluding a group, this can create 
or revive tensions within groups or between certain groups and the state that may 
have caused the conflict in the first place.  
 
Second, since in many FCASs the state is in the process of consolidating power, there 
is a risk that an intervention supporting certain actors and institutional reforms may 
unwittingly favor one group over another. It may also lead to an overly powerful state 
and close off the space for citizen engagement.  
 
Third, the government may be fearful of opening up the space for negotiation and 
dialogue.  
 
(Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 201) 
 
9.3 Big decisions in current debates 
Caricaturing hugely, current theories of action are evolving in two contrasting directions – do 
more versus do less. 
 
9.3.1 Do more 
The ‘do more’ camp is epitomised by the TWP/DDD networks on the governance side, and 
on empowerment and accountability, by Jonathan Fox’s call for aid actors to move from 
tactical to strategic approaches: tactical interventions are bounded, limited to demand-side 
interventions and ‘Assume that information provision alone will inspire collective action with 
sufficient power to influence public sector performance’ (Fox 2015: 25). In contrast, strategic 
interventions are coordinated across multiple levels and points of entry, combine actions on 
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both the supply and demand sides, and are ‘iterative, contested and therefore uneven 
processes’ (Fox 2015: 25). 
 
More generally, strategic interventions involve increased attention to the social contract, 
alliances, ‘convening and brokering’ and real time feedback and iteration. Care Netherlands 
found that the same accountability tool (community scorecards - CSC) served different 
purposes in fragile and non-fragile settings: in fragile contexts in Burundi and South Sudan, 
the CSC tool was used mainly at the beginning of an intervention to build relationships with 
local authorities and start opening up spaces for dialogue - a challenging endeavour given 
the repressive context of these countries. In more post-conflict contexts such as Rwanda, 
Care found that these processes were able to feed into national government planning.17     
 
Capacity building and the social contract: In many FCVAS, both state and citizens’ 
organisations are weaker than in non-fragile settings. In Northern Mali ‘after the 2013 revolt: 
“Even neighbors no longer trusted people they had known for decades. Communities were 
shattered” (Van Wicklin 2014)’ (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 205). In addition, when social 
networks exist, they are usually ‘bonding’ rather than ‘bridging’ networks and may cause 
violence in the society (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 205). This may create a false dichotomy 
between ‘bad’ bonding capital and ‘good’ bridging capital - without bonding social capital 
there is nothing to bridge. But the relative combination and interaction of the two is clearly of 
great importance in E&A processes FCVAS, not least in terms of their impact on conflict. 
Such analysis has led to a focus on building the capacity of weak CSOs whether directly 
(e.g. through training and funding) or more indirect methods such as peer learning and 
south-south cooperation (U4 AntiCorruption Resource Centre 2011). 
 
The greater risks of demand-side advocacy, and the weakness of the state’s ability to 
respond, have led to a greater focus on building the social contract between states and 
citizens. 
 
The social contract refers to the (largely informal) agreement of citizens to submit to 
the authority of government in exchange for protection of their rights and access to 
services, security and justice. Citizens will refrain from anarchy and respect the law; 
government will govern according to the law, and promote peace and development. 
Developing a social contract in a fragile context, as elsewhere, will be the product of 
ongoing explicit and implicit negotiation between different interest groups and a range 
of formal and informal power-holders; the resultant ‘contract’ will not be a static 
agreement but will be subject to renegotiation and changes in circumstances over 
time.  
(Oxfam 2014b: 5) 
 
In some FCVAS, this approach needs to be adjusted. In Myanmar, for example, the state is 
not in control or legitimate in many geographical areas, and the remit of the social contract 
needs to be extended to the relationship between citizens and non-state or quasi-state 
authorities such as ethnic armed administrations.  
 
A 2011 study of social accountability programmes in East Timor, Afghanistan, and Liberia 
concluded that donors should ‘strengthen the social contract, by understanding power 
dynamics, and supporting alliances that cut across the public-private divide’ (U4 Anti 
Corruption Resource Centre 2011: 4). 
 
In his accompanying synthesis paper from the A4EA Programme, Jonathan Fox (2016) 
builds on these insights, arguing that to achieve sustainable institutional change, CSOs and 
reformers must band together into coalitions that work at the local, subnational, national, and 
                                                 
17  Care Netherlands, Pers comm., September 2016 
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transnational levels. Such “vertically integrated” strategies must be keenly aware of the 
different levels of power — from the international to the local levels — and leverage these 
power dynamics to drive change (Guillán et al. 2016). 
 
Others go still further, arguing that accountability is best seen as a complex, evolving 
ecosystem, a characterisation that leads to a focus on bottlenecks and ‘enabling 
environments’ rather than particular impact chains (Halloran 2015). 
 
Convening and Brokering: In situations where trust between communities, sectors, state 
and citizens is in short supply, external actors can play a valuable role in ‘keeping people in 
the room’, using their convening power to bring different players together to negotiate and 
build the social contract. In Timor Leste, since the decades-long independence movement 
culminated in independence from Indonesia in 2002, Luta Hamutuk (meaning ‘struggle 
together’) has been engaging authorities in managing the nation’s budget, natural resources 
and the delivery of infrastructure and services. With over 150 community focal points across 
the country, Luta Hamutuk conducts community briefings, seminars and training of trainers 
to share information on the national budget and development project implementation, 
thereby bridging the state and society. Luta Hamutuk has created a bridge between the 
capital Dili, rural communities and international networks, including the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, bringing together government, civil society and the private sector at 
all levels. It is itself part of the INGO-supported international Network for Integrity in 
Reconstruction (U4 AntiCorruption Resource Centre 2011). 
 
Oxfam’s Tajikistan Water Supply and Sanitation (TajWSS) Programme convenes a bimonthly 
forum involving 17 government ministries and agencies, the UN family, INGOs, academia, 
the media, Tajiki CSOs, the private sector, and parliamentarians. The forum has so far 
triggered the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Co-ordination Council (IMCC), which meets four 
times a year to discuss policy and to make decisions. It has also led to a new investment law 
and a co-funding agreement with the government. What is notable in terms of theories of 
action was that none of the ‘wins’ was foreseeable, and long term (10 year) funding from the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) was essential to allow this emergent 
theory of change to proceed.18 
 
Cross-Sectoral Alliances: The weakness of traditional development partners (state, CSOs) 
makes an even stronger case for building alliances of ‘unusual suspects and awkward allies’ 
in pursuit of enhanced E&A. In Afghanistan, Oxfam’s Within and Without the State 
programme (WWS, see Box 6.1, pages 27-8) is running a project that pairs traditional 
religious leaders with high-profile women, trained in Sharia law. Each pair works together to 
settle local disputes, challenge harmful traditional practices (such as giving away girls), and 
to promote women's rights. The Ulema (traditional religious leaders) are also working with 
community leaders to gain acceptance of women’s participation in community peace 
councils. While religious leaders can sometimes act as blockers, this project attempts to 
build on their sense of responsibility for their communities and enlist them as allies for 
change (Oxfam 2014b). 
 
Iteration, multiple parallel experiments and real time evaluation: Iteration and adaptation 
are increasingly understood as vital to navigating the complexities of E&A programming, 
often involving real time evaluation to provide the evidential basis for changes in direction. 
However, it is much less common to see the more ambitious ‘venture capitalist’ approach of 
supporting multiple parallel start-ups in the knowledge (and acceptance) that some will fail 
while others prosper.  
 
                                                 
18  http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/convening-and-brokering-in-practice-sorting-out-tajikistans-water-problem/ 
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One exception is Oxfam’s Chukua Hatua project in Tanzania aimed at improving local 
authorities’ accountability to their citizens, explicitly modelled on evolutionary theory. In the 
first phase, multiple parallel experiments were initiated in the same region, from ‘farmer 
animators’ who encouraged peasant communities to engage with village officials, to ‘active 
musicians’ who visited primary school student councils to spread the word about the benefits 
of community participation. The project plan stipulated that this experiment in variation would 
be followed at a predetermined date by selection. Communities, partners, and Oxfam staff 
met to identify the most successful variants, which were then expanded and adapted. 
Farmer animators proved the most promising; communities nominated non-farmers as 
animators, including a father who was trying to convince families to send their daughters to 
school and a woman who was organising fellow traders at the local market. The first 
generation of animators was put to work training the new arrivals (Oxfam 2015). 
 
Green (2016: 244) suggests a 2x2 typography that may help identify promising approaches 
in different contexts. The two axes (see Figure 9.1) correspond to an actor’s degree of 
confidence in their understanding of the context, and in the efficacy of their intervention.  
 
Figure 9.1: Approaches to the complexities of E&A programming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Green (2016), CC BY-NC-ND, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode  
 
If programme staff are operating in a stable or predictable context with a well understood 
change strategy (upper right quadrant), it may be entirely appropriate to use a traditional 
linear planning approach, albeit with good mechanisms for feedback and rapid response 
should their confidence be unwarranted.  
 
If the context is stable, but staff are not sure what kind of change strategy might work 
(bottom right quadrant), then it may be best to experiment with several different ones, and 
iterate according to the results.  
 
If they are fairly sure about the strategy but not about the context (upper left quadrant), the 
emphasis should include setting up fast feedback systems to detect and respond rapidly to 
sudden changes. 
 
Experiments and 
iteration 
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intervention 
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Finally, if they are neither confident of their understanding of the context nor their change 
strategies (bottom left quadrant), it may be worth adopting a positive deviance approach 
(looking for positive outliers thrown up by the existing system, rather than focussing on an 
external intervention). Alternatively, programme staff can look for a simpler, or more tried-
and-tested intervention to allow them to move into the top left quadrant, or spend time 
understanding the context much better, so they can move to the bottom right. FCVAS 
correspond to the left hand side of the figure, suggesting some of the approaches picked up 
below as ‘hypotheses to test’. 
 
9.3.2 Do less 
The ‘do less’ response comprises two broad currents. The first current is those who conclude 
that, given the difficulties and risks, donors should first ‘restore confidence by mobilising 
‘inclusive-enough’ coalitions of stakeholders and by delivering results’ (World Bank 2011: 
120). Stirring up the citizenry in such circumstances is counterproductive: ‘the conventional 
idea of supporting a pent-up ‘demand for good governance’ must be put aside...Citizen 
pressure will normally lead to more effective clientelism, not better public policies’ (Booth 
2012: 57).  
 
In this analysis, empowerment is seen as an outcome of stability and economic growth, 
rather than an immediate need or initial condition. These analyses focus instead on 
influencing elite bargains and political settlements to improve economic policy and 
downwards accountability, for example by hiring and working with ‘development 
entrepreneurs’, whose focus is on identifying and pursuing reforms that are technically 
sound and politically possible, using insider lobby techniques rather than either the long or 
short route to accountability (Faustino and Booth 2014).  
 
The second current within the pessimistic camp focuses on supporting an ‘enabling 
environment’ of transparency and access to information, rather than engaging with particular 
political processes. Devarajan and Khemani (2016) argue that: 
 
There is an inherent hubris in assuming that external actors will have the capacity to 
identify the appropriate entry points and engineer reforms in the right direction, 
simultaneously solving both the technical policy problem and that of adapting it to 
political constraints. Ex ante, there is little reason to believe that the selected entry 
points are the right ones; they may make the situation worse. The incentives of donor 
organisations to show results and count reforms as success are further reasons to 
search for other approaches that do not depend entirely upon external agencies’ 
getting both the economics and the politics right.  
(Devarajan and Khemani 2016: 6).  
 
They propose instead that donors should focus on building the ‘enabling environment’ for 
endogenous change processes, arguing for a focus on providing knowledge to citizens ‘to 
nourish the transparency that is needed for citizens’ engagement, to build their capacity to 
select better leaders who wield power in government, as well as sanction them if they fail to 
deliver’ (Devarajan and Khemani 2016: 2).  
 
In practice, much of this boils down to promoting transparency. In Opening the Black Box: 
The Contextual Drivers of Social Accountability, Grandvoinnet et al. argue that: 
 
Accurate and neutral information is essential for rebuilding trust between citizens and 
the state and is particularly hard to access in FCASs. (Re)building an information 
ecosystem that emphasizes inclusive information flows (that reach all groups within 
society) is a pressing agenda that SA [social accountability] interventions may enable. 
(Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 15) 
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The authors conclude that a robust theory of action in FCAS should include: 
 
First, support and encourage government to become a trustworthy source of accurate 
information, able to heed and address the concerns of the public, build public trust, 
and ensure public support for reconstruction. Doing so is important generally, but 
insufficient information from government officials can become a serious source of 
wider grievance. Second, support the institutions of civil society that advocate for an 
independent media. There are various examples of such institutions in countries 
around the world, such as press clubs and local chapters of organizations that call for 
the protection of journalists. Third, strengthen the professionalism of journalists and 
media organizations and ensure that they are able to report with sensitivity. In FCASs, 
journalists are often untrained and unskilled. Often, there are no schools of journalism, 
and the only training that reporters receive is on the job. Sensitivity training is essential 
in fragile contexts, especially when biased reporting could stem from a lack of 
understanding or sympathy and an inability to understand events from different 
perspectives. It is, however, crucial that this kind of support be provided uniformly 
throughout the country. Finally, identify opportunities to harness information and 
communication technology and other modern information technologies. 
(Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 208–9) 
 
While the authors recognise that transparency alone is not enough, their ‘transparency plus’ 
list still falls well short of a plausible theory of action. Ostrom’s work on the conditions for 
effective collective action on social dilemmas (Ostrom 2010) suggests that they include: 
 
 available and reliable information about the immediate and longer term costs and 
benefits of actions; 
 the individuals involved see the shared resources as important for their own 
achievements and have a longer term time horizon for rights of access and use; 
 those involved have or are able to gain a reputation for being a trustworthy 
reciprocator;  
 individuals can communicate with at least some of the others involved; 
 informal monitoring and sanctioning is feasible and considered appropriate; 
 social capital and leadership exist, related to previous successes in solving joint 
problems; 
 rules and sanctions imposed by external authorities are viewed as legitimate and 
enforced equitably on all. 
 
Moreover, there is often an implicit assumption in the enabling environment approach that it 
is politically neutral. Access to information, space for civil society and media freedom are just 
as contested (if not more so) than with more targeted social accountability efforts.  
 
This raises the important question of whether there are minimum conditions for attempts to 
promote E&A in FCVAS. The authors of Opening the Black Box appear to think so, saying: 
 
In some contexts, the minimum requirement to engage in SA may be lacking. If conflict 
is particularly intense and there is no end in sight, supporting SA is probably 
premature. The basic structures of local governance, for example, need to be in place 
for citizens to be able to engage with them. There should be some notion of a social 
contract or at the least the possibility of negotiating one. Basic infrastructure is also 
necessary to disseminate information.  
(Grandvoinnet et al. 2015: 212) 
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A number of scholars have been critical of this kind of reliance on transparency and open 
data. Fox queries the assumptions underlying this theory of action: 
 
That people who have been denied voice and lack power will perceive vocal 
participation as having more benefits than costs (if the costs are recognised at all). The 
second assumption is that even if locally bounded voices do call for accountability, 
their collective action will have sufficient clout to influence public sector performance - 
in the absence of external allies with both perceived and actual leverage. 
(Fox 2015: 352) 
 
A slightly more nuanced approach is emerging from these critiques. According to DFID’s 
Tessa MacArthur19 ‘Currently we are very interested in the role of “infomediaries”20 – you 
can’t just put information into the public domain and expect results. You need groups located 
between citizen and state that make data meaningful, e.g. media, investigative journalists, 
CSOs’. 
 
A good example of infomediary promotion is provided by BBC Media Action’s work on 
‘creating space’, which aims to connect communities with national debates, while at the 
same time encouraging normative shifts and the ‘reimagining of social relations... between 
groups in society and in power, including those between men and women’ (BBC Media 
Action 2016: 6). In Nepal, BBC Media Action supports a debate show, Sajha Sawal 
(Common Questions), which has a female presenter, seeks to ensure there is a female 
panellist on each show, and has a live audience that is more than 40 per cent female. All 
programmes encourage reflection on how issues affect men and women differently. 
Programmes also regularly focus on women’s rights issues such as dowry related violence. 
The programme broadcasts to over 6.3 million Nepalis (BBC Media Action 2016).  
 
 
10  Conclusion and hypotheses to test 
This paper identifies three underlying sources of confusion that are hindering progress on 
both understanding E&A in FCVAS, and taking helpful action to promote it. They are: 
 
 Theory of change versus theory of action 
 Fragility versus conflict 
 Empowerment versus accountability 
 
In this section these are discussed in turn, along with suggestions for hypotheses that can 
be tested during the A4EA research programme. 
 
10.1 Theory of change v theory of action 
Aid actors typically fail to distinguish clearly between a theory of endogenous change, that 
seeks to understand how FCVAS undergo transitions to higher levels of empowerment and 
accountability, and their own theories of action. In the hundreds of donor and aid agency 
documents reviewed for this paper, endogenous change receives remarkably little attention 
compared to aid agencies own analytical frameworks, programme experiences, and 
suggestions for best practice for external actors. 
 
The consequences of this are serious. A focus on endogenous change inevitably 
encourages a systems thinking approach, appreciating the complexity of the plethora of 
actors and feedback loops present in any society or change process, and contrasting this 
                                                 
19  Author interview, August 2016 
20  For more on infomediaries, see www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/HDR1347.pdf 
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with the largely linear nature of project plans and donor interventions (Green 2016). By 
conflating actual change with their own activities, external actors both exaggerate their own 
importance, and miss significant endogenous drivers and dynamics of change in the 
systems they hope to influence. Examples include: the importance of critical junctures, the 
role of non-state actors, or the use of positive deviance approaches to identify existing 
positive outliers on any given aspect of E&A. A focus on these dynamics could greatly enrich 
thinking and practice on E&A by showing in more detail the range of contexts and drivers of 
change that have led to increased voice for poor communities, even in unpromising settings, 
with potential lessons for aid providers. 
 
Hypotheses to test: 
 
Theory v practice: The main obstacle to turning evolving theories of action into programme 
practice is the institutional design of the aid business. There are examples of re-engineering 
of incentives and processes that can help overcome these barriers. 
 
Lessons of history: More research on the politics and critical junctures that gave rise to 
‘turnaround states’ could contain valuable lessons for current approaches on E&A in FCVAS, 
as well as demonstrating the ways in which states have moved away from violence and 
fragility due to their own endogenous processes and resources. 
 
Adaptive management: AM techniques, including fast feedback loops and agile 
programming, are particularly relevant and useful in FCVAS settings. 
 
Critical junctures: E&A work in FCVAS will be more effective if it gives greater priority to the 
role of critical junctures (whether predictable or not) as drivers of change. Aid agencies and 
others need to understand the conditions, and the types of change, for which critical 
junctures should be prioritised and/or how to combine the critical juncture approach with a 
more gradual one, as well as improving the ability to detect and respond to such events. 
 
Positive deviance: Including positive deviance as part of due diligence in programme design 
will lead to a wider range of potentially effective theories of action. 
 
Multiple parallel experiments: In complex FCVAS, aid agencies may obtain better results on 
E&A by deliberately pursuing an evolutionary cycle of variation/selection/amplification. 
Variation would involve multiple parallel pilots and experiments; selection, a clearly 
delineated process for selecting the more/less promising variants; amplification could involve 
either going to scale, or seeking further variations within the more promising areas identified 
in earlier rounds. 
 
10.2 Low state capacity versus conflict 
There is no clear justification for combining the different aspects of fragility into a single 
category. Two salient aspects for E&A are state capacity and the use of violence to resolve 
disagreements and disputes. In reality, many conflicts coexist with high levels of state 
capacity, while low levels of state capacity (either national or subnational) often do not 
generate or coexist with high levels of violence. 
 
Conflating the two issues into the one FCVAS category muddles attempts to distinguish 
between E&A in different settings, and in practice it gives insufficient weight to issues of 
violence, trust and fear that profoundly change the risks and logic of working on E&A in 
dangerous places. 
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Hypotheses to test: 
 
Conflict sensitivity and do no harm: Since change processes in FCVAS are more likely to be 
unpredictable and violent, with greater risks attached, conflict sensitivity approaches are a 
critical enabling factor for empowerment and accountability, and will both help reduce the 
risks associated with E&A programming, and increase the chances of success. 
 
10.3 Empowerment versus accountability 
While the academic literature is more evenly balanced in its attention between 
empowerment and accountability, donor analysis and practice in recent years has been 
overwhelmingly weighted towards accountability, and exhibits only the most limited 
understanding or interest in the nature of power and how its different aspects interact and 
evolve over time. One notable exception has been ongoing work on gender rights and 
women’s empowerment, which has kept the flame of interest alive in the nature of informal 
power in particular. 
 
Ignoring the nature of power and its flux in different contexts makes it extremely difficult to 
design effective empowerment strategies. It is particularly damaging in FCVAS because 
power is more likely to flow through, and be negotiated, in the less visible channels of norms 
and social relationships or traditional and customary leadership structures, rather than 
through the formal channels of the state, judiciary and formal politics. Empowerment and 
accountability efforts that ignore these other forms of power are unlikely to be effective in 
dealing with issues, for example, of trust-building or gender rights. It may be worth revisiting 
and updating the literature of earlier decades in this area. 
 
Hypotheses to test: 
 
Non-state actors: Traditional thinking on the role of the state as a duty bearer and source of 
accountability needs to be extended to NSAs in FCVAS. If different external aid and 
development agencies can overcome their institutional and ideational obstacles to working 
with NSAs, their E&A work will have more impact. 
 
Informal Power: Successful E&A interventions in FCVAS should give greater weight to 
empowerment, especially in informal spheres, and in the early stages of an intervention.  
 
This paper’s overall hypothesis is that clarifying and responding to these three conflations 
will improve both understanding and practice on E&A in FCVAS, generating a series of 
research questions and hypotheses to test during the course of the A4EA programme.  
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